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Abstract
Different markets are cleared by different types of prices—sellerspecific prices that are uniform across buyers in some markets, and
personalized prices tailored to the buyer in others. We examine a setting in which buyers and sellers make investments before matching
in a competitive market. We introduce the notion of premuneration
values—the values to the transacting agents prior to any transfers—
created by a buyer-seller match. Personalized price equilibrium outcomes are independent of premuneration values and exhibit inefficiencies only in the event of “coordination failures,” while uniform-price
equilibria depend on premuneration values and in general feature inefficient investments even without coordination failures. There is thus
a trade-off between the costs of personalizing prices and the inefficient
investments under uniform prices. We characterize the premuneration
values under which uniform-price equilibria similarly exhibit inefficiencies only in the event of coordination failures.
Keywords: Directed search, matching, premuneration value, prematch investments, search.
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Pricing and Investments in Matching Markets
1
1.1

Introduction
Investment and Matching Markets

We analyze a model in which agents match to generate a surplus which they
then split. Prior to matching, the agents make investments that will affect
the size of the surplus.
For example, suppose there is a continuum of workers and a continuum
of firms, each with unit mass. Each worker and firm first makes a costly
investment in an attribute—firms invest in technology while workers invest in
human capital. In the second stage, workers and firms match and generate
a surplus. In the absence of any monetary transfers, the firm owns the
output produced by the worker, while the worker bears the cost of the effort
exerted in the course of production and owns the value of the skills learned
in the course of production. We call these costs and benefits the agents’
premuneration values (from pre plus the Latin munerare, to give or to pay).
Both the surplus and its division between buyer and seller premuneration
values depend on the attributes the agents have chosen. The worker’s human
capital may enhance the quality of the output owned by the firm, and the
firm’s technology may enhance the value of on-the-job learning to the worker.
The final division of the surplus between the worker and firm is determined
by the premuneration values and a subsequent monetary transfer.
A large literature examines settings in which agents make investments
before trading in a market. One extreme, discussed by Williamson (1975),
treats the case of a single buyer and seller. The agents’ post-investment market power then gives rise to a “hold-up” problem that prompts inefficient investments. At the other extreme, Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite (2001) and
Peters and Siow (2002) examine models with competitive post-investment
markets, featuring a continuum of heterogenous buyers and sellers and frictionless trading, showing that equilibria with efficient investments exist.
Our analysis falls between these two. Our post-investment markets again
feature continua of heterogeneous agents, but we introduce a key friction into
the trading process, namely that firms (continuing with our example) cannot
observe workers’ attribute choices.

1.2

Personalized Pricing

The appropriate equilibrium notion in our setting is not obvious, to a large
extent because we must determine the returns to attributes that nobody
chooses. Continuing with our example, it is helpful to first consider the
case in which firms can observe workers’ investments. We refer to this as
personalized pricing, since wages can be conditioned on the chosen attributes
of both the firm and the worker. In this setting, an equilibrium would be
a specification of the attribute chosen by each firm and worker, a wage
function and a matching of firms and workers such that no agent can increase
his utility by changing his decision and such that markets clear, i.e., the
matching is one-to-one.
This equilibrium notion is similar to Walrasian equilibrium, except that
the wage function attaches a value only to pairs of firm and worker attributes
that are chosen in the investment stage, and not to unchosen attributes. In
the language of Walrasian equilibrium, the price vector includes a price for
every good present in the market, but not for nonexistent goods. We address
the latter with a requirement that no firm (say) can unilaterally deviate to
adopting some currently unchosen attribute and then match with a worker
at her existing attribute, while splitting the surplus in such a way as to make
both better off.
Environments in which people must decide which goods to bring to market or which investments to make before entering the market readily give
rise to coordination failures. In the extreme, there is an autarkic equilibrium in which neither firms nor workers invest because no one expects the
other side to invest. We could preclude such coordination failures by simply
assuming that prices exist for all attributes, in and out of the market. On
the one hand, we find the existence of such prices counterintuitive. More
importantly, like Makowski and Ostroy (1995), we expect coordination failures to be endemic when people must decide what goods to market, and
hence think it important to work with a model that does not preclude them.
Personalized-price equilibria can be shown to exist using a variant of
the existence argument in Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite (2001). There
exist coordination-failure equilibria with inefficient investments, but there
also exist exist efficient equilibria in which no worker-firm pair, matched or
unmatched, could be made jointly better off, even if they could commit to
their investments prior to matching. Premuneration values are irrelevant,
in the sense that every personalized price equilibrium outcome remains an
equilibrium outcome irrespective of the allocation of premuneration values.
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1.3

Uniform Pricing

We are interested in the case in which firms cannot observe workers’ attribute choices. Wages can then depend only on firms’ attributes, and we
speak of uniform pricing to emphasize that workers who have chosen different attributes must be offered the same wage. Our equilibrium notion
is a specification of the attribute chosen by each firm and worker, a wage
function, and a choice of firm on the part of each worker, such that no agent
can increase his utility by changing his decision and such that markets clear.
Analogous to personalized price equilibrium, the possibility of coordination
failures again arises.
We show that a uniform-price equilibrium exists. However, these equilibria are in general inefficient, even if they exhibit no coordination failures.
There exist efficient uniform-price equilibria if, and essentially only if, firms’
premuneration values are independent of workers’ attributes. Hence, premuneration values matter for uniform-price equilibria.
While it may be unrealistic to think that workers’ attributes are literally
unobservable, ascertaining these attributes may nonetheless be quite costly.
Expanding beyond our worker-firm example, estimates from 11 highly selective liberal arts colleges indicate that they spent about $3,000 on admissions,
i.e., ascertaining students’ attributes, per matriculating student in 2004.1
The cost for identifying whether a foreign high school diploma comes from a
legitimate high school is $100.2 There may thus be substantial savings from
posting uniform prices and letting buyers sort themselves, if the premuneration values are such that uniform prices can do this sorting. Alternatively, if
the premuneration values are such that uniform prices cannot duplicate the
allocation of personalized prices, and if transactions costs or institutional
considerations preclude personalized prices, then market outcomes will be
inefficient.

1.4

Premuneration values

The premuneration values of the firms in our motivating example will typically depend on their employees’ attributes—better skilled and more productive employees will enhance the quality and quantity of a firm’s output.
The business pages are filled with announcements of the good news that a
1
Memorandum, Office of Institutional Research and Analysis, University of Pennsylvania, July 2004. We thank Barnie Lentz for his help with these data.
2
“Vetting Those Foreign College Applications,” New York Times, September 29, 2004,
page A21.
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firm has hired a particularly prized employee. Moving beyond this example,
students are matched with universities after students have incurred substantial preparation costs and universities have hired faculty. Both sides care
about the investments the other side has made. Universities reap benefits
well beyond tuition revenues from talented students, and students clamor
for spots at elite universities. Similarly, an aspiring faculty member cares
about the investments a university has made in facilities and other faculty,
while the university cares about the investment in knowledge and research
capabilities of the potential recruit.
The central message of this paper is that there is a tradeoff between the
costs of personalizing pricing and the inefficiency of uniform pricing. One
might hope to ameliorate this tradeoff by reallocating the premuneration
values. In particular, premuneration values are affected by the explicit and
implicit property rights to the costs and benefits that flow from a match. For
example, one could arrange the premuneration values in a university/student
interaction so that the university owns all of the surplus. This would require
a somewhat unconventional arrangement in which the university shares in
the future income of students to whom it gives degrees. However, incomecontingent loans in a number of countries (including Australia, Sweden and
New Zealand) that effectively give the lender a share of students’ future
income (Johnstone, 2001) attest to the possibility of such an arrangement.3
There are often, however, constraints on the design of premuneration
values. Moral hazard problems loom especially large. If universities owned
a large share of students’ enhanced future income streams, why would the
students exert the effort required to realize this future income? How are we
to measure and collect the increment to income attributable to the university
education? Such an arrangement might also require changes in labor laws
that preclude involuntary servitude. More generally, laws concerning workplace safety, the (in)ability to surrender legal rights, the division of marital
3
In the summer of 2010, the UK debated the possibility of partially funding higher education though a “graduate tax” levied on college graduates’ income
(http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/education-10649459). Basketball star Yao Ming (Houston Rockets) has a contract with the China Basketball Association calling for 30%
of his NBA earnings to be paid to the Chinese Basketball Association (in which he
played prior to joining the Rockets), while another 20% will go to the Chinese government. Similar arrangements hold for Wang Zhizhi (Dallas Mavericks) and Menk Bateer (Denver Nuggets and San Antonio Spurs). (See the Detroit News, April 26, 2002,
http://www.detnews.com/2002/pistons/0204/27/sports-475199.htm/.) We can view the
initial match between Yao Ming and his Chinese team as producing a surplus that includes
the enhanced value of his earnings as a result of developing his basketball skills, and the
contract as setting premuneration values.

4

assets and the custody and sale of children may constrain the allocation of
premuneration values. Our analysis points to the cost of such constraints or
institutional arrangements, in the form of personalization costs or inefficient
uniform pricing.

1.5

Related Literature

Our model is related to the literature on competitive search (see Guerrieri,
Shimer, and Wright (2010) for a recent contribution and for pointers to the
literature). We depart from a standard competitive search model in three respects. First, we include a first stage at which investments are made, whereas
most competitive search models begin with buyers and sellers with exogenously given attributes. Second, we assume that both buyers and sellers
are “totally heterogeneous,” in the sense that no two buyers or sellers have
the same cost of acquiring attributes. As a consequence of this heterogeneity, our equilibria (under either personalized or uniform pricing) perfectly
separate investing agents—no two buyers who make nontrivial investments
choose the same seller at the matching stage. Third, like Guerrieri, Shimer,
and Wright (2010), we introduce a key friction into the competitive search
model, asymmetric information, in the sense that sellers cannot condition
prices on buyers’ characteristics.
Our analysis differs from that of Guerrieri, Shimer, and Wright (2010)
most notably in the nature of the prematching investment choice. In their
model, only sellers make investments, and these consist of paying a fixed cost
to participate in the second stage. Sellers who enter the second stage are
homogenous, making it more difficult to screen buyers than in our model.
Premuneration values play no role in their model and coordination failures
cannot arise. The resulting equilibria are inefficient, and the inefficiencies
arise not at the investment stage but out of constraints on the ability to
screen workers. In contrast, in our model, the continuum of possible investments available to agents on both sides of the market is the source of
inefficiencies, with the existence and nature of inefficiency depending upon
the nature of the premuneration values.
Variants of competitive search models have been used to accommodate
sources of friction other than asymmetric information. The most obvious
such friction is to assume that buyers and sellers cannot instantly match. Instead, buyers must engage in costly search, including the prospects of being
either temporarily or permanently unable to find a seller (e.g., Niederle and
Yariv (2008) and Peters (2010)). We forgo including such considerations in
order to focus on one friction at a time, in our case asymmetric information.
5

Our focus on creating incentives for efficient investments is shared by a
number of other papers.4 Acemoglu and Shimer (1999) analyze a workerfirm model in which firms (only) make ex ante investments. If wages are
determined by post-match bargaining, then the resulting effective power
gives rise to a standard hold-up problem inducing firms to underinvest. The
hold-up problem disappears if workers have no bargaining power, but then
there is excess entry on the part of firms. Acemoglu and Shimer show that
efficient outcomes can be achieved if the bargaining process is replaced by
wage posting on the part of firms, followed by competitive search. de Meza
and Lockwood (2009) examine an investment and matching model that gives
rise to excess investment. Their overinvestment possibility rests on a discrete set of investment choices and the presence of bargaining power in a
noncompetitive post-investment stage. In contrast, the competitive postinvestment markets of Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite (2001) and Peters
and Siow (2002) lead to efficient two-sided investments.
Moving from complete-information to incomplete-information matching
models typically gives rise to issues of either screening, as considered here,
or signaling. See Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite (1995), Hopkins (forthcoming), Hoppe, Moldovanu, and Sela (2009), and Rege (2008) for models that
incorporate signaling into matching models with investments.

2

The Model

2.1

The Market

There is a unit measure of buyers whose types are indexed by β and distributed uniformly on [0, 1], and a unit measure of sellers whose types are
indexed by σ and distributed uniformly on [0, 1]. For ease of reference,
buyers are female and sellers male.
Buyers and sellers have an outside option (with payoff zero) that precludes participation in the matching process. If they do not take this option,
they make choices in two stages. First, each buyer simultaneously chooses
an attribute b ∈ R+ and each seller simultaneously chooses an attribute
s ∈ R+ . Second, buyers and sellers match, with each match generating a
surplus to be split between the participating agents.
4

Early indications that frictionless, competitive search might create investment incentives appear in Hosios (1990), Moen (1997) and Shi (2001). Eeckhout and Kircher (2010)
provide an extension to asymmetric information, while Masters (2009) examines a model
with two-sided investments.

6

Attributes are costly, but enhance the surplus generated in the second
stage. To keep the analysis tractable, we assume that agents’ types affect
the first-stage cost of investment but not the second-stage surplus, which
depends only on the attributes chosen by the agents. In particular, the cost
of attribute b ∈ R+ to buyer β is given by cB (b, β) and the cost of attribute
s ∈ R+ to seller σ is given by cS (s, σ). The total surplus from a match
involving buyer attribute b and seller attribute s is given by v(b, s).
Suppose that a buyer and seller match and create surplus v(b, s), but
(presumably counterfactually) no transfers are made. The surplus is still
divided between the buyer and seller, and it may well be that both receive
some of the surplus. A firm that does not pay its employee may capture
much of the surplus, in the form of the value of the employee’s production.
The employee’s surplus includes the cost of her effort, but may also include
the value of her enhanced human capital stemming from her association with
the firm. We refer to the portions of the surplus that accrue to the agents
in the absence of transfers as their premuneration values. We let hB (b, s)
denote the premuneration value of the buyer and hS (b, s) the premuneration
value of the seller, with
hB (b, s) + hS (b, s) = v(b, s).
The premuneration values depend on the nature of the interaction between the two agents and the legal and institutional environment in which
that interaction takes place. For example, the law may stipulate that the
employer owns the output produced by an employee and owns any patents
that emerge from the employees work, but that the employee owns the value
of any contacts she makes while on the job.
The important point is that a match creates a surplus, independent
of transfers. Some of this surplus is owned by the seller and the rest by
the buyer, as specified by the premuneration values. Premuneration values
are thus the counterparts of endowments in standard general equilibrium
models.
Transfers alter the division of the surplus. A match between a buyer and
seller with attribute choices (b, s) at a price p yields a gross (i.e., ignoring
investment costs) buyer payoff of
hB (b, s) − p,
and a gross seller payoff of
hS (b, s) + p.

7

We assume that prices must be uniform, meaning that prices can be
conditioned only on seller attributes. Any buyer who trades with a given
seller does so at the same price, regardless of the buyer’s attribute (though
trades involving different sellers may occur at different prices).
There are several factors that would constrain prices to be uniform.
First, it may be prohibitively expensive for sellers to observe buyers’ characteristics. For example, firms may be unable to observe whether their
potential employees have invested in effective work habits. Second, tailoring prices to buyers’ attribute choices may entail prohibitive menu costs.
A college may prefer to set uniform prices rather than bear the cost of an
admissions department to carefully vet applicants. Similarly, it may be costless to use generic contract forms to make a standard offer to every buyer
who appears, while tailoring offers to buyers’ characteristics requires a costly
legal process. Third, legal restrictions may prescribe uniform pricing. For
example, employers may be prohibited from discriminating against potential
employees whose attributes make them potentially expensive health risks,
or union contracts may prohibit wage discrimination.
In each case, the constraints that give rise to uniform pricing also determine which of the two parties’ attributes prices can be conditioned on. If
buyer attributes are unobservable, then the only possibility is to condition
prices on seller attributes. It will be convenient to consistently call the side
of the market on which prices can be conditioned sellers. Prices may then
be either positive or negative, and the agent we call a seller may in ordinary
parlance be called either a buyer or seller.

2.2

Example: Basic Structure

We introduce here an example that we carry throughout the analysis. The
premuneration values are such that a fixed share θ ∈ (0, 1] of the surplus
goes to the buyer (Footnote 5 explains why θ = 0 is excluded), so that
hB (b, s) = θbs and hS (b, s) = (1 − θ)bs,
where the surplus function is given by v(b, s) = bs and the cost functions by
cB (b, β) =

b3
3β

and cS (s, σ) =

s3
.
3σ

It is then a straightforward calculation (with details in Appendix A.1)
that the efficient outcome entails attribute-choice functions
b(β) = β

and s(σ) = σ,
8

and positive assortative matching, so that seller σ matches with buyer β = σ,
and the pair produces total surplus σ 2 for a total net surplus 13 σ 2 .

3

Equilibrium

3.1

Assumptions

Assumption 1 (Supermodularity) The premuneration values hB : R+ ×
R+ → R and hS : R+ × R+ → R are C 2 , increasing in b and s, and satisfy5
∂ 2 hB
>0
∂b∂s

and

∂ 2 hS
≥ 0.
∂b∂s

There is a simple class of problems for which this assumption holds
that includes our example: premuneration values constitute fixed shares
of the surplus, or hB (b, s) = θv(b, s) and hS (b, s) = (1 − θ)v(b, s) for some
θ ∈ (0, 1], and the surplus function v : R+ ×R+ → R is strictly supermodular
(∂ 2 v/∂b∂s > 0), as well as (twice continuously) differentiable and increasing
in b and s.
Our next assumption is a “no free surplus” requirement that matches
are not profitable without investments:
Assumption 2 (Essentiality) The premuneration values hB (b, 0) and hB (0, s)
are constant in b and s, respectively, and
hB (0, 0) + hS (0, 0) = 0.
The following single-crossing condition requires that higher-index buyers
and sellers are more productive, in the sense that they have lower investment
costs:
5

The asymmetry in this assumption—it requires a strict inequality on the cross partial
of hB , but only a weak inequality on that of hS —reflects our convention that sellers set
prices. If the derivative for buyers is zero, then every buyer will attempt to purchase from
the same seller, destroying all hope of sorting buyers. Peters (2010) illustrates the complications that arise if buyers’ premuneration values do not depend on sellers’ characteristics.
However, Section 4.2 shows that there exist efficient uniform-price equilibrium outcomes if
and only if seller premuneration values do not depend on buyer attribute choices, making
it important to include the weak inequality for the seller. As will become clear, this zero
second derivative for the seller poses no difficulty. The asymmetry that appears in the
first part of Assumption 2 similarly arises out of the convention that sellers set prices,
though this part of the Assumption is more technical in nature, allowing us to rule out
some troublesome boundary cases.
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Assumption 3 (Single-crossing) The cost function cB : R+ ×[0, 1] → R+
is C 2 , strictly increasing and convex in b, with cB (0, β) = 0 = ∂cB (0, β)/∂b
and
∂ 2 cB
< 0.
∂b∂β
The cost function cS satisfies analogous conditions.
Our next assumption ensures that efficient attribute choices exist and
are bounded.
Assumption 4 (Boundedness) There exists b̄ such that for all b > b̄,
s ∈ R+ , β ∈ [0, 1] and σ ∈ [0, 1],
v(b, s) − cB (b, β) − cS (s, σ) < 0.
A similar statement, with an analogous s̄, applies to sellers.

3.2

Feasible Outcomes

We next define feasible matchings between buyers and sellers. We denote
by b : [0, 1] → [0, b̄] and s : [0, 1] → [0, s̄] the Lebesgue-measurable functions
describing the attributes chosen by buyers and sellers.
The closures of the sets of attributes chosen by buyers and sellers respectively are denoted by B ≡ cl(b([0, 1])) and S ≡ cl(s([0, 1])). We refer to
B and S as the set of marketed attributes. Let λB and λS be the measures
induced on B and S by the agents’ attribute choices: for Borel sets B 0 ⊂ B
and S 0 ⊂ S,
λB (B 0 ) = λ{β ∈ [0, 1] : b(β) ∈ B 0 }
and

λS (S 0 ) = λ{σ ∈ [0, 1] : s(σ) ∈ S 0 },

where λ is Lebesgue measure. The measures of buyers and of sellers who
choose the zero attribute are denoted by β ≡ sup{β : b(β) = 0} and σ ≡
sup{σ : s(σ) = 0}.
We simplify the analysis by restricting attention to equilibrium attributechoice functions that are strictly increasing when positive (i.e., b(β) > 0 and
β 0 > β imply b(β 0 ) > b(β), and similarly for s) and that assign equal masses
of buyers and sellers to zero attribute choices. We show that equilibria exist
with attribute choice functions satisfying these restrictions. More general
feasible matchings could be defined, but at the cost of considerable technical
complication.
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Definition 1 Suppose b and s are strictly increasing when positive and
that σ = β. A feasible matching is a pair of measure-preserving functions
b̃ : (S, λS ) → (B, λB ) and s̃ : (B, λB ) → (S, λS ) satisfying

and

s̃(b̃(s)) = s for all s ∈ s((σ, 1]),

(1)

b̃(s̃(b)) = b for all b ∈ b((β, 1]).

(2)

Given a feasible matching (b̃, s̃), b̃(s) specifies the buyer attribute matched
to a seller with attribute s, and s̃(b) specifies the seller attribute matched
to a buyer with attribute b. Observe that equations (1) and (2) imply that
s̃ is one-to-one on b((β, 1]) and b̃ is one-to-one on s((σ, 1]). The measurepreserving requirement on b̃ ensures that the measure of any set of sellers is
equal to the measure of the set of buyers with whom they are matched, i.e.,
λB (b̃(S 0 )) = λS (S 0 ) for all Borel S 0 ⊂ S (and similarly for s̃).
We have simplified the analysis by defining the matching functions b̃ and
s̃ on the closures S and B of the sets of chosen attributes. In many cases
of interest, efficient attribute-choice functions are discontinuous (see Cole,
Mailath, and Postlewaite (2001, Section 2) for an example of discontinuous
attribute-choice functions with personalized pricing (cf. Section 6.1)). Since
the sets B and S are the closures of the sets of attribute choices, a seller σ
(with attribute choice s(σ)) may be matched with a buyer attribute choice
b that is not chosen by any buyer. We interpret such a seller as matching
with a buyer whose attribute choice is arbitrarily close to b, while retaining the convenience of saying that s(σ) matches with b. Defining feasible
matchings on either the agents directly or on the sets of attributes (rather
than their closures) would avoid this interpretation, at the cost of requiring
the equivalent but more complicated formulation used in Cole, Mailath, and
Postlewaite (2001).
Definition 2 A feasible outcome (b, s, b̃, s̃) is a pair of attribute-choice
functions b and s that are strictly increasing when positive and satisfy σ = β,
along with a feasible matching (b̃, s̃).

3.3

Uniform Pricing

Sellers post prices that depend on their own attribute choices, but not the
attributes of buyers. We describe these prices by a uniform-price function
pU : S → R.
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Given a feasible outcome (b, s, b̃, s̃) and a uniform-price function pU the
payoffs to a buyer β choosing b ∈ B and a seller σ choosing s ∈ S are
ΠB (b, β) ≡ hB (b, s̃(b)) − pU (s̃(b)) − cB (b, β)
and

ΠS (s, σ) ≡ hS (b̃(s), s) + pU (s) − cS (s, σ).

Under uniform pricing, sellers cannot condition on buyer attributes. Consequently, sellers choose only their own attributes. Buyers, on the other hand,
choose attributes and can choose any marketed seller attribute regardless of
their own attribute choice. These choices should maximize payoffs. A buyer
β optimizes (at b) given pU if
ΠB (b(β), β) =

max

(b,s)∈R+ ×S

hB (b, s) − pU (s) − cB (b, β).

(3)

Similarly, a seller σ optimizes (at s) given pU if
ΠS (s(σ), σ) = max hS (b̃(s), s) + pU (s) − cS (s, σ).
s∈S

3.4

(4)

Equilibrium

The uniform-price function pU determines the payoff to a buyer for any
attribute he chooses and any seller he matches with, since prices do not depend on the buyers’ attribute choices. It also determines the payoff to any
seller who chooses a marketed attribute (i.e., s ∈ S), but not for nonmarketed attributes, since such attributes are not priced by the function pU . We
think of a seller who chooses a nonmarketed attribute as naming the price
at which he is willing to trade, and then trading with one of the buyers
willing to trade at this price, if there are any. However, this attribute and
price combination potentially attracts many buyer attributes, all of which
are indistinguishable to the seller. The following definition requires that the
seller’s deviation to (s0 , p) with s0 6∈ S be profitable irrespective of the buyer
attracted.6
Definition 3 Given (b, s, b̃, s̃, pU ), there is a profitable seller deviation if
there exists σ such that either (i) ΠS (s(σ), σ) < 0 or (ii) there exists an
unmarketed attribute choice s0 6∈ S, a price p ∈ R, and at least one buyer
b0 ∈ B such that
6
We could extend Definition 3 to cover deviations to any seller attribute (rather than
simply unmarketed seller attributes), as well as deviations to other prices at the seller’s
current attribute. Appendix B shows that if buyers optimize given pU and sellers have no
profitable deviations in this extended sense, then sellers must also be optimizing given pU .
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hB (b0 , s0 ) − p > hB (b0 , s̃(b0 )) − pU (s̃(b0 )),

(5)

and for any such b0 ,
hS (b0 , s0 ) + p − cS (s0 , σ) > ΠS (s(σ), σ).
If ΠS (s(σ), σ) < 0, the outside option is better for the seller than the
prescribed choice. This part of the definition plays only a technical role in
the analysis, ensuring that we are not inappropriately forcing our agents to
participate in the market. We will make greater use of the second requirement, that a profitable seller deviation arises if there is some seller who can
choose an unmarketed attribute and set a price that attracts some buyers,
and then earn a higher payoff from any attracted buyer than in the putative
equilibrium.
Remark 1 (Profitable Deviations) A seller is defined to have a profitable deviation under uniform pricing only if he is better off when matched
with any buyer who is attracted to the deviation. Why make sellers so pessimistic? One could alternatively think of requiring only that the seller be
better off given a random draw from the set of attracted buyers. Though
the details of the calculations (and the existence proof) would differ considerably, the qualitative forces behind our results would remain. In particular,
the essence of uniform pricing is that the seller cannot stipulate which buyers he is willing to trade with and which he is not. This inability affects the
seller most starkly when we assume the seller draws the worst buyer from
the set of willing buyers, but the effects remain as long as the seller cannot
select the best buyer.
Adopting the pessimistic formulation that seller deviations must be profitable when matched with the worst willing buyer makes seller deviations
less attractive and hence enlarges the set of uniform-price equilibria. Our
key results (Propositions 1 and 2), establishing conditions under which there
exist efficient uniform price equilibria, are rendered more powerful by such
a permissive definition of equilibrium.

Definition 4 A feasible outcome (b, s, b̃, s̃) and a uniform-price function
pU : S → R constitute a uniform-price equilibrium if all agents optimize
given pU and the seller has no profitable deviations.
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Remark 2 The definition of a uniform-price equilibrium is reminiscent of
that of a subgame-perfect equilibrium of a game, but with many of the details
of the game left unspecified. In particular, given a candidate equilibrium, the
deviations in the agents’ choices (attribute choices and matching) that would
preclude this outcome and price from being an equilibrium are identified
without specifying the precise result of the deviations. For example, suppose
that given an outcome (b, s, b̃, s̃), buyer β could get a higher payoff by
deviating and choosing seller attribute s0 rather than the prescribed seller
attribute s̃(b(β)). This would result in there being two buyers matched with
seller s0 , and if we were to model this as a well-defined game we would have
to specify which buyer ends up matched with the seller. One could provide
such specificity, but doing so gives rise to a number of arbitrary choices
and technical issues that obscure the underlying economics. Analogous to
the definition of Walrasian equilibrium, we simply say that an outcome and

price is an equilibrium when no such deviations exist.
Remark 3 (Complete Pricing) By altering Definition 4 to require pU to
have domain [0, s], thereby setting a price for every seller attribute (whether
marketed or not), and expanding to [0, s̄] the set of seller attribute choices
over which the buyer optimizes, we obtain a complete uniform-price equilibrium. Notice, however, that the matching function is still restricted to
marketed attributes, and hence the seller’s payoff when choosing an unmar
keted attribute is still separately defined as in Definition 3.
Remark 4 (Hedonic Pricing) In a uniform-price equilibrium, each buyer
faces prices over seller attributes, and so it is tempting to interpret the
prices as hedonic prices. However, since sellers care about buyer attributes
and the prices are not a function of these attributes, all payoff-relevant
characteristics are not priced.7 Accordingly, a uniform-price equilibrium is

not an equilibrium in hedonic prices.

3.5

Example: A Uniform-Price Equilibrium

Under uniform pricing, buyer β faces a uniform-price schedule pU and chooses
a buyer attribute b and a seller attribute s ∈ S to solve
max θbs − pU (s) −
b,s

b3
.
3β

7
Of course, in equilibrium, each seller can infer the buyer attribute that is matched
with each marketed attribute at the equilibrium price.
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When choosing an attribute s, the seller is selected by a buyer with attribute
b = b̃(s) and receives prices pU . The seller σ thus solves
max (1 − θ)b̃(s)s + pU (s) −
s

s3
.
3σ

The uniform-price equilibrium is given by the following collection (the derivation appears in Appendix A.2):

and

b(β) = θ 3 (2 − θ) 3 β,

2

1

(6)

1
3

2
3

(7)

s(σ) = θ (2 − θ) σ,

1/3
θ
θ
pU (s) =
s2 ,
2 2−θ
1/3

θ
s.
b̃(s) =
2−θ

(8)
(9)

When θ = 1, this uniform-price equilibrium gives the efficient outcome
calculated in Section 2.2. In this case, the restriction to uniform pricing
imposes no efficiency costs, and giving sellers the ability to condition prices
on buyer attributes would have no effect on behavior or payoffs. Conversely,
when θ < 1, the uniform-price equilibrium is inefficient, in that the generated surplus of almost all matched pairs is not maximized. We discuss this
inefficiency further in Section 4.3.
Note that the equilibrium is not unique. In particular, all buyers and
sellers choosing the zero attribute is also an equilibrium outcome.

4

Efficiency

When are uniform-price equilibrium outcomes efficient? Efficiency fails (i.e.,
total surplus is not maximized) when either the wrong agents are matched
or the wrong attributes agents are chosen by matched.

4.1

Efficient Matching

Efficiency requires that the second-stage matching be positively assortative
in attributes. The supermodularity assumptions on premuneration values
guarantee this positive assortativity in equilibrium.
Lemma 1 In any uniform-price equilibrium (b, s, b̃, s̃, pU ), b̃ and s̃ are strictly
increasing for strictly positive attributes, and so the matching is positively
assortative in attributes.
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Proof. Suppose b̃ is not strictly increasing. Since b̃ is one-to-one on s((σ, 1])
(see Definition 1 and its following comment), there exists 0 < s1 < s2 with
b1 ≡ b̃(s1 ) > b̃(s2 ) ≡ b2 . Adding
hB (b1 , s1 ) − pU (s1 ) ≥ hB (b1 , s2 ) − pU (s2 )
and
hB (b2 , s2 ) − pU (s2 ) ≥ hB (b2 , s1 ) − pU (s1 )
gives
hB (b1 , s1 ) + hB (b2 , s2 ) ≥ hB (b1 , s2 ) + hB (b2 , s1 ),
contradicting the strict supermodularity of hB .
Equation (2) then implies that s̃ is strictly increasing.

4.2

Efficient Investments

Efficiency at the investment stage requires that the attribute choice functions
(b, s) satisfy
(b(φ), s(φ)) ∈ arg max W (b, s, φ),
b,s∈R+

where
W (b, s, φ) ≡ v(b, s) − cB (b, φ) − cS (s, φ).
This efficiency is not guaranteed. We begin with some intuition, appropriate when equilibrium is characterized by first-order conditions. Fix a
uniform-price equilibrium. By standard incentive compatibility arguments,
the uniform-price function is differentiable. The first-order conditions implied for the buyer’s choice of attribute b and matching attribute choice s
in a uniform-price equilibrium are
dhB (b, s) dcB (b, β)
−
db
db
dhB (b, s) dpU (s)
0=
−
,
ds
ds

0=
and

(10)
(11)

while the seller’s first-order condition for choosing s is (assuming b̃ is differentiable)
0=

dhS (b̃(s), s) db̃(s) dhS (b̃(s), s) dpU (s) dcS (s, σ)
+
+
−
.
db
ds
ds
ds
ds
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(12)

Using (11) to eliminate dpU (s)/ds in (12) and then using the identity v(b, s) =
hB (b, s) + hS (b, s) in (10) and (12), these three first-order conditions can be
reduced to
dv(b, s) dhS (b, s) dcB (b, β)
−
−
db
db
db
dhS (b, s) db̃(s) dv(b, s) dcS (s, σ)
0=
+
−
.
db
ds
ds
ds

0=
and

Efficiency requires than any matched buyer and seller maximize the difference between the surplus they generate and their investment costs, giving
rise to the first-order conditions:
dv(b, s) dcB (b, β)
−
db
db
dv(b, s) dcS (s, σ)
0=
−
.
ds
ds
0=

(13)

Comparing these, it is immediate that the solution to the first-order conditions for an efficient allocation will be a solution for the first-order conditions
for the uniform-price equilibrium if dhS (b, s)/db = 0, that is, if each seller’s
premuneration value is independent of the attribute choice of the buyer
with whom the seller is matched. Moreover, the same argument shows that
when seller premuneration values are independent of buyer attributes, every
uniform-price equilibrium is constrained efficient, in that no efficiency gains
can be achieved without a simultaneous deviation to unmarketed buyer and
seller attributes. In other words, inefficiency arises only out of coordination
failure.
These arguments are summarized in the following proposition. The proof
follows the preceding intuition (though it requires no differentiability assumptions), and so is relegated to Appendix C.
Proposition 1 Suppose the sellers’ premuneration values do not depend
on the buyer’s attribute. There exist efficient uniform-price equilibria. In
addition, every uniform-price equilibrium outcome (b, s, b̃, s̃) is constrained
efficient:
W (b(φ), s(φ), φ) =

max W (b, s, φ)
b∈b([0,1]),
s∈R+

= max W (b, s, φ).
b∈R+ ,
s∈s([0,1])
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The constancy of hS (b, s) in b is also essentially necessary for personalizedprice equilibria to be achieved via uniform pricing. The “essentially” here
is that this constancy need not hold for pairs (b, s) that are not matched in
equilibrium.8
Proposition 2 Suppose the efficient outcome (b, s, b̃, s̃) can be supported as
a uniform-price equilibrium outcome. Then for all s ∈ S,
dhS (b̃(s), s)
= 0.
db
Proof. It follows from (10) and (13) (again, without any differentiability
assumptions beyond those placed on the primitives of the model in Assumptions 1 and 3), that if (b, s, b̃, s̃, pP ) is and efficient outcome that can be
supported by uniform prices, then
dv(b̃(s), s)
dhB (b̃(s), s)
=
,
db
db
implying dhS (b̃(s), s)/db = 0.

4.3

Example: Efficiency

Suppose first that sellers own none of the surplus (i.e., θ = 1, and hence
hS (b, s) = 0 and dhS (b, s)/db = 0). In this case, the uniform-price equilibrium of Section 3.5 results in an efficient outcome. Consequently, no seller
would gain by personalizing his price even if he could and the ability to
personalize prices is irrelevant.
In the efficient outcome, the buyer’s equilibrium attribute choice is b(β) =
β. Buyer attributes in the uniform-price equilibria are again a linear function of the buyer’s index, with slope θ2/3 (2 − θ)1/3 . This slope is below 1 for
all θ < 1, that is, buyers’ investments are inefficiently low. The inability to
personalize prices prevents sellers from offering buyers lower prices in return
for higher buyer attributes. As a result, the return on buyers’ investments
under uniform pricing is less than the social return, and buyers choose lower
attributes than would be efficient.
The magnitude of the inefficiency decreases as θ increases. The smaller
the buyers’ premuneration values, the larger the extent to which their attribute choices fall short of efficient levels.
8

Analogously, the single-crossing condition is essentially necessary for a separating
equilibrium in a signaling model.
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Figure 1: Uniform-price equilibrium attribute choices as a function of θ, the
buyers’ premuneration-value share of the surplus. The lower curved line is
the coefficient of the (linear) buyer attribute-choice function, while the upper
curved line is that of the seller attribute-choice function. Both coefficients
are 1 in the efficient outcome.
Sellers’ attribute choices in the uniform-price equilibrium are similarly
a linear function of index, with slope θ1/3 (2 − θ)2/3 . Since this exceeds the
buyer coefficient, buyers choose smaller attributes than sellers, with buyers
of attribute choice level b matching with values s > b.
Perhaps surprisingly, the sellers’ investment behavior is not monotonic
in θ, as illustrated in Figure 1. For low levels of θ—when the sellers’ share
of the surplus is near 1—sellers invest very little. This is to be expected
since the value of their investment depends on buyers’ investment, which is
low in this case. The slope of the seller attribute-choice function initially
increases in θ, a consequence of the increase in buyers’ attribute choices and
the increase in the price a seller attribute fetches. When θ ≈ .38, sellers
make precisely the attribute choices under uniform pricing that they would
in the efficient outcome. The equilibrium is still inefficient, however, as
buyers invest too little. For larger values of θ, uniform pricing leads sellers
to invest more than they do in the efficient outcome.
To understand this seller behavior, notice that a seller would like to
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screen the buyers to whom he sells, but the inability to personalize prices precludes doing so directly. The key to screening buyers is that high-attribute
buyers have a higher willingness to pay for high-attribute sellers than do
low-attribute buyers. Sellers then have an incentive to choose higher attributes (than the efficient level) and charge higher prices. As θ increases,
buyer attribute choices increase, making screening all the more valuable to
sellers. As a result, seller attribute choices continue to increase above their
efficient levels as θ increases above .38.
Once θ reaches 2/3, sellers’ attribute choices no longer increase (though
seller attribute choices remain above efficient levels). Buyers’ attribute
choices continue to increase as θ increases, but the decreasing share that
sellers receive makes screening less valuable, and hence investment less attractive.
Sellers’ incentives to screen buyers lead not only to attribute choices
that exceed the efficient investments, but also to attribute choices that are
inefficiently high given the buyers’ (inefficiently low) attribute choices, for
all θ < 1. In equilibrium seller σ is matched with buyer β = σ, who makes
attribute choice θ2/3 (2 − θ)1/3 σ. The net surplus (ignoring the cost of b)
from a match of seller σ with such a buyer is
sθ2/3 (2 − θ)1/3 σ −

s3
.
3σ

The seller attribute maximizing this surplus is
s(σ) = σθ1/3 (2 − θ)1/6 ,
which is smaller than the seller’s equilibrium attribute choice of σθ1/3 (2 −
θ)1/3 .

5

Existence of Equilibrium

Appendix D establishes the existence of uniform-price equilibria, by showing
the existence of complete uniform-price equilibria (see Remark 3).
Proposition 3 If there exists (b, s) ∈ (0, b̄] × (0, s̄] with
hB (b, s) + hS (0, s) − cB (b, 1) − cS (s, 1) > 0,

(14)

then there exists a complete uniform-price equilibrium in which some buyers
and some sellers make strictly positive attribute choices.
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Moreover, if for all φ ∈ (0, 1], there exists (b, s) ∈ (0, b̄] × (0, s̄]
hB (b, s) + hS (0, s) − cB (b, φ) − cS (s, φ) > 0,

(15)

then there exists a complete uniform-price equilibrium with b(β), s(σ) > 0
for β, σ ∈ (0, 1].
In general, condition (14) is stronger than the requirement that there be
a positive surplus for the most efficient match (though (14) is implied by
that requirement if hS (b, s) is independent of b, the condition of Proposition
1). Uniform-pricing equilibria are inefficient when hS (b, s) depends on b,
and if this dependence is too extreme, (14) may fail and there may be no
investment on either side.
Two significant complications must be confronted in the proof of existence of uniform-price equilibria: Equilibrium attribute-choice functions
may be discontinuous, and we must preclude profitable deviations to attributes not in the market. These complications preclude the direct application of a fixed point theorem. We proceed indirectly, constructing a
simultaneous-move three-player game whose equilibria capture the relevant
behavior of uniform-price equilibria. The players include a buyer, whose
payoff corresponds to the total buyer payoff in our model, a seller whose
payoff is analogous but who does not set prices, and a price-setter who is
penalized for market imbalance. In constructing this game, we define seller
payoffs in a manner incorporating the pessimism inherent in our definition
of uniform-price equilibrium. Glicksberg’s fixed point theorem establishes
the existence of Nash equilibria in the three-player game when strategies are
constrained to be Lipschitz continuous. We then examine the limit as this
constraint is removed, showing that the result corresponds to a uniform-price
equilibrium of the underlying economy.

6

Discussion

6.1
6.1.1

Comparison with Personalized Pricing
Personalized Price Equilibrium

The obvious point of comparison for a uniform price equilibrium is with
a scenario in which prices can be conditioned on both buyer and seller
characteristics. In such a scenario, there is a personalized-price function
pP : B × S → R, where pP (b, s) is the (possibly negative) price that a seller
with attribute choice s ∈ S receives when selling to a buyer with attribute
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choice b ∈ B. This gives rise to a personalized price equilibrium, analogous
to that of a uniform price equilibrium except that sellers can charge different
prices to different buyers, and the possibility of a profitable deviation to an
unmarketed attribute is now open to buyers as well as sellers. Appendix E
develops the details, establishing the following results.
• Personalized price equilibria exist, and are, modulo some technical
differences in the specification, equivalent to the ex post contracting
equilibria of Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite (2001).
• Personalized price equilibria are constrained efficient, in the sense that
there is no alternative, Pareto superior allocation that restricts buyers
and sellers to choosing attributes marketed in the equilibrium. Personalized price equilibria may exhibit “coordination failure” inefficiencies,
in which mutual gains could be realized if buyers and sellers both bring
currently unmarketed attributes to the market. There exists an efficient personalized-price equilibrium.
• Premuneration values are irrelevant for personalized-price equilibria.
For a given specification of premuneration values and attendant personalized price equilibrium, any other specification of premuneration
values admits a personalized-price equilibrium whose outcome, including investments, matching function, and payoffs, duplicate that of the
original equilibrium.
• Under the conditions of Proposition 1, uniform and personalized price
equilibria coincide. In this case, the ability to personalize prices is
irrelevant. Personalization brings sellers no advantage, and even the
slightest cost of personalization would suffice to ensure that we see
uniform pricing.
The essence of our results, culminating in Propositions 1 and 2, is to
establish conditions under which personalization is redundant. If these conditions hold, uniform prices also lead to efficient equilibrium outcomes. If
not, uniform prices are inextricably linked to inefficient investments. Under
uniform pricing, premuneration values matter.
6.1.2

Example: Personalized Pricing

Returning to our example, suppose that sellers observe buyers’ attribute
choices and so can personalize their prices. If buyers and sellers optimize
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given the personalized-price function
pP (b, s) =

s2
− (1 − θ)bs,
2

(16)

the result is a feasible and efficient outcome.9 In particular, given the pricing
function (16), buyer β chooses the attribute b = b(β) = β and chooses to
match with seller attribute s = b(β). The seller chooses attribute s = s(σ) =
σ. The resulting matching of buyers and sellers clears the seller attribute
market (in that the distributions of demanded and supplied seller attributes
agree) and the resulting outcome is efficient. Appendix A.3 contains the
details and confirms that this is a personalized-price equilibrium.
If θ < 1 in our example, then all buyers receive lower payoffs under
uniform than under personalized prices.10 A natural conjecture is that sellers
are necessarily disadvantaged by the inability to personalize prices. The
seller’s equilibrium payoff in the uniform-price equilibrium is given by
(1 − θ)b̃(s(σ))s(σ) + pU (s(σ)) −

(s(σ))3
1
= θ(2 − θ)2 σ 2 .
3σ
6

When θ = 1, this duplicates the payoff from the personalized-price equilibrium. For θ for which sellers’ attributes exceed the personalized-price equilibrium level, every seller actually earns a higher payoff under the uniformprice equilibrium. This higher payoff results from the higher prices that
buyers are willing to pay for the higher attributes chosen by sellers when
they cannot personalize prices.
Why don’t we see such higher prices under personalized pricing? Suppose that given a uniform-price equilibrium, a single seller had the ability to
personalize prices. Such a seller could profitably reduce his attribute choice
and the price at which he trades, using personalization to exclude the undesirable buyers that render such a deviation unprofitable under uniform
pricing.
6.1.3

Which Prices are Personalized?

Personalizing prices requires a seller to set a price for every buyer attribute
in the market. However, personalized-price outcomes can be achieved with
9

Note that for any seller attribute s, the price that a seller would receive in a match
with a buyer with attribute b is decreasing in b—higher values of b are more valuable, and
hence sellers are willing to charge less for them.
3
10
The buyer’s payoff under uniform pricing, θs̃(b(β)) − pU (s̃(b(β))) − (b(β))
= 16 θ2 (2 −
3β
2
θ)β , falls short of the buyer’s payoff in the personalized-price equilibrium.
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much simpler pricing schemes. The apparent absence of complicated pricing
schemes thus need not signal the absence of personalized pricing.
The critical feature of personalized pricing is the seller’s ability to exclude
buyers with attribute choices lower than the seller’s equilibrium match. In
particular, by charging a sufficiently high price to specific buyer attribute
choices, a seller can ensure that buyers with those attributes will chose not
to buy. We denote this sufficiently high price by P . A personalized-price
function pP is a uniform-rationing price if it has the form
(
pU R (s), ∀b ≥ b̃(s),
pP (b, s) =
P,
otherwise,
for some pU R : S → R+ and b̃ : S → B. Under uniform-rationing pricing, a
seller with attribute choice s sets a uniform price p(s) = pU R (s), but then
excludes any buyers with b < b† (s).
Appendix E.4 provides the straightforward argument that any personalizedprice equilibrium outcome can be supported by a uniform-rationing price.
Hence, personalized pricing may be ubiquitous without one observing complete menus of prices. Whenever we observe sellers rejecting some buyers—
colleges denying some applicants, or firms rejecting some workers as unqualified—
we are observing forms of personalized pricing.11

6.2

Information

Suppose sellers are constrained to set uniform prices because buyers’ attributes are not observable, but that buyers can certify these attributes,
perhaps by taking exams or completing internships that demonstrate their
skills. One might suspect that if the cost to buyers of certifying their attribute is not too high, the uncertainty might “unravel”: high-attribute buyers would reveal themselves, making it optimal for the highest-attribute buyers in the remaining pool to reveal themselves, and so on until all buyers’
attributes are known.12 In addition, it seems that this cascading information revelation must make at least lower-ranked buyers worse off, if not
all buyers. Indeed, to avoid such unraveling, Harvard Business School students have successfully lobbied for policies that prohibit students’ divulging
11

Peters (2010) examines a model in which personalized prices are achieved via uniform
rationing.
12
See Grossman (1981), Milgrom (1981), or Okuno-Fujiwara, Postlewaite, and Suzumura (1990) for analyses of such unraveling.
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their grades to potential employers, while the Wharton student government
adopted a policy banning the release of grades.13
In contrast, in our example, all buyers may be worse off when information about their attributes is suppressed than when it is known. This
result holds no matter what (nonzero) share the buyers own of the surplus,
and holds for all buyers. It is the distorted incentives to invest that ensure
even the lowest attribute buyers would be made worse off if buyer-attribute
information were suppressed.

6.3

Who Should Set Prices?

Suppose we could design the informational or legal context so that one side
of the market can set prices, but cannot observe the characteristics on the
other side of the market. Which should we choose? We return to our
example. When θ = 0, so the seller owns all of the surplus, the equilibrium
collapses into the trivial equilibrium in which no surplus is generated. In
this case, a buyer’s payoff is solely the price pU , which will have to be
negative in order to bring buyers into the market, and buyers will choose
the seller posting the smallest (“largest negative”) price. Because sellers
cannot condition prices on buyer attribute choice, every buyer will choose
b = 0 in equilibrium. Similarly, when θ is positive but small, the equilibrium
is markedly inefficient, featuring tiny attribute choices. This is an indication
that the “wrong” side of the market is setting prices, that is, the side setting
prices owns little of the surplus. Suppose personalization by a price setter
is precluded for some reason other than informational asymmetries (such as
legal restrictions or transaction costs), but that an alternative market design
would allow buyers to post uniform prices (i.e., prices that only depend on
buyer attributes). While it is more efficient for sellers to be the price setters
for θ > 12 , it would be more efficient to have buyers post prices when θ < 21 .

6.4

Overinvestment or Underinvestment?

The inefficiencies arising in hold-up problems are well understood. The
inefficiencies that arise under uniform pricing are qualitatively different, as
is easily seen from the overinvestment by sellers in our example for some
values of θ. The inefficiencies in uniform price equilibria in our model stem
from sellers’ use of attribute choice as an instrument to screen buyers, in
addition to price, and the response of buyers.
13
Ostrovsky and Schwarz (2010) investigate the optimal amount of information to disclose from the students’ perspective.
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It is unclear whether these inefficiencies lead in general to over- or underinvestment. To provide insight into the nature of the forces involved, it
is useful to analyze why the outcome of a personalized-price equilibrium
(bP , sP , b̃P , s̃P , pP ) is not a uniform-price equilibrium outcome. Consider
the outcome (bP sP , b̃P , s̃P ) with uniform price pU (s) = pP (b̃(s), s). With
this uniform price, buyers who previously matched with low attribute sellers
find sellers with higher attributes more attractive, since the uniform price
does not penalize low attribute buyers. This suggests that in a uniformprice equilibrium, a seller could discourage low attribute buyers by raising
his price, and to avoid losing the high attribute buyers, also raising his
attribute. The supermodularity in premuneration values ensures that it is
possible to screen buyers in this way.
However, simply altering the seller attributes and pU is not sufficient in
general to obtain a uniform price equilibrium. There are two distinct issues.
First, in a personalized-price equilibrium, from the envelope theorem, the
impact on a buyer β of a marginal deviation from bP (β) is given by
∂hB (b, s) ∂pP (b, s) ∂cB (b, β)
−
−
,
∂b
∂b
∂b
evaluated at s = s̃(b). In contrast, in a uniform-price equilibrium, the
second term (∂pP /∂b) is absent. Second, the seller attributes (and prices)
are different than in the personalized-price equilibrium. It is a priori unclear
which effect will dominate. In our running example, the buyers underinvest,
and for θ not too small, the sellers overinvest.
Characterizing the nature of the investment inefficiencies in uniformprice equilibria will necessarily depend on the specifics of the premuneration
values and the attribute cost functions. Similarly, little can be said about
whether it would be more efficient for one side or the other to set prices at
a general level; in particular, it will not be a function only of the premuneration values of the two sides.

6.5

Premuneration Values

Our main result is that under uniform pricing, the decomposition of the total
surplus of a match into the buyer and seller premuneration values affects the
efficiency of prematch investments. Appropriately specified premuneration
values can allow us to avoid either the cost (or impossibility) of personalizing
prices or the inefficiencies of uniform pricing.
Premuneration values can sometimes be rearranged by appropriate legal
and institutional innovations. The match of researchers and universities gen26

erates a surplus that includes the value of marketable patents from faculty
research. Historically, universities have owned these patents, but another
institutional arrangement could grant them to the faculty. The feasibility
of such ownership is reflected in the decisions of many universities to unilaterally grant professors shares in the revenues from patents stemming from
their research. Why aren’t all premuneration values specified so as to allow
efficient uniform-pricing outcomes?
Section 1.4 highlighted moral hazard problems. Monitoring considerations may also play a role. Consider a collection of heterogeneous and
risk averse agents who are to be matched with risk neutral principals. One
could ensure that the principal’s premuneration values are independent of
agent characteristics by assigning ownership of the technology to the agents.
Uniform pricing per se would then impose no costs, but the agents would
inefficiently bear all of the risk associated with the match, leading to inefficient actions and less valuable matches. We could instead let the principal
own some or all of the technology, but now the principal’s premuneration
value will no longer be independent of the characteristics of the agent with
whom he is matched.14 Finally, legal restrictions may be at work.15
Putting these considerations together, new monitoring and contracting
technologies may be valuable, not only because they can create better incentives within a match, but also because they can create more leeway for
designing premuneration values and hence better matching.
14
Even before the incentive-design stage, simply measuring and contracting on the relevant variables may pose difficulties. The University of New Mexico sued a former researcher for rights to patents that he applied for four years after he had left the university,
arguing that the patents stemmed from research that he had done before leaving. (“Universities Try to Keep Inventions From Going ‘Out the Back Door,’ ” Chronicle of Higher
Education, May 17, 2002.) In principle, the owner of the rights to a song is entitled to a
payment each time the song is played on the radio in a bar or health club, but collection
is impractical.
15
For example, Bulow and Levin (2006) note that the National Residency Matching
Program matching medical residents and hospitals constrains hospitals to make the same
offers to all residents. They argue that the primary effect is not inefficient matching
but a transfer of surplus to the hospitals (with Niederle and Roth (2003, 2005) offering
an alternative view). However, Nicholson (2003) argues that the result is an inefficient
allocation of residents to specialties. Medical students who do their residency acquire
training that dramatically increases their future earnings. Nicholson argues that this
part of the surplus from the match (which is owned by the student) is so large in some
specialties (such as dermatology, general surgery, orthopedic surgery and radiology) that
if personalized prices were employed, medical students would pay hospitals handsomely
for the opportunity to do their residency in these specialities. This is as compared to their
stipend, which was $44,700 in 2007/8 (Association of American Medical College Survey
of Household Stipends, Benefits and Funding, Autumn 2007 Report).
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Appendix
A
A.1

Example, Detailed Calculations
Efficiency

Efficiency requires that for each matched pair β and σ, attribute choices b
and s solve
b3
s3
max bs −
−
,
b,s
3β 3σ
giving first-order conditions
s−

b2
=0
β

and b −

s2
= 0.
σ

Efficiency also requires positive assortative matching in attribute (and so
in index, since the cost functions guarantee that attribute choices will be
increasing in index). We can accordingly solve by setting σ = β, which in
turn implies s = b, giving the efficient attribute-choice functions
b(β) = β

A.2

and s(σ) = σ.

Derivation of (6)–(9)

The buyer chooses an attribute b and a seller attribute s with whom to
match in order to solve
max θbs + pU (s) −
b,s

b3
.
3β

Assuming pU is differentiable, the first-order conditions for the buyer are
b2
=0
β
θb − p0U (s) = 0.
θs −

and

When choosing an attribute s, the seller is selected by a buyer with attribute
b = b̃(s). The seller σ thus solves
max (1 − θ)b̃(s)s + pU (s) −
s

s3
,
3σ
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implying (assuming b̃ is differentiable) the first-order condition
(1 − θ)[b̃0 (s)s + b̃(s)] + p0U (s) −

s2
= 0.
σ

Begin by conjecturing that the equilibrium attribute-choice functions are
given by the linear functions

and

b(β) = Aβ

(A.1)

s(σ) = Bσ.

(A.2)

Then, assuming that in equilibrium, a buyer of type β matches with seller
of type σ = β, we have b̃(s) = As/B. Using this, rewrite the buyer’s second
first-order condition as θAs/B − p0U (s) = 0 and solve for the price function
pU (s) =

θA 2
s .
2B

The requirement that low index traders be willing to participate in the
market implies that the constant of integration equals 0. Similarly, rewrite
the buyer’s first first-order condition as θBb/A − b2 /β = 0 and solve for b,
yielding
θB
b=
β.
(A.3)
A
Turning to the seller, write the first-order condition as 2(1 − θ)As/B +
θAs/B − s2 /σ = 0 and solve for s,
s=

(2 − θ)A
σ.
B

(A.4)
2

1

Combining (A.1) with (A.3) and (A.2) with (A.4), yields A = θ 3 (2 − θ) 3
1
2
and B = θ 3 (2 − θ) 3 . It is straightforward to verify that the second order
conditions are satisfied, and so the conjecture is verified.

A.3

Personalized Prices

Suppose that sellers observe buyers’ attribute choices and so can personalize
their prices. Consider the candidate personalized-price function
pP (b, s) =

s2
− (1 − θ)bs.
2

(A.5)
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Given the pricing function (A.5), buyer β chooses a buyer attribute b and
a seller attribute s (i.e., chooses to match with a seller with that attribute)
to solve
max θbs −
b,s

s2
b3
s2
b3
+ (1 − θ)bs −
= max bs −
−
.
2
3β
2
3β
(b,s)

Hence, buyer β chooses the attribute b = b(β) = β and chooses to match
with seller attribute s = b(β). The implied distribution of demanded seller
attributes is uniform on [0, 1].
When choosing an attribute s, the seller is selected by a buyer with
attribute b = b̃(s) = s. The seller σ thus solves
max (1 − θ)b̃(s)s +
s

s2
s3
s2
s3
− (1 − θ)b̃(s)s −
= max
−
,
s
2
3σ
2
3σ

yielding the attribute choice s = s(σ) = σ. The implied distribution of
supplied seller attributes is uniform on [0, 1].
The resulting matching of buyers and sellers clears the seller attribute
market (in that the distributions of demanded and supplied seller attributes
agree). We thus have a personalized-price equilibrium.
Equilibrium payoffs to the seller and buyer are

and

B

(s(σ))2 (s(σ))3
σ2
σ3
1
−
=
−
= σ2
2
3σ
2
3σ
6
β2
β3
1
(b(β))2 (b(β))3
−
=
−
= β2.
2
3β
2
3β
6

The Absence of Profitable Deviations and Optimization given pU

Say that a seller has an extended profitable deviation if either he has a
profitable seller deviation in the sense of Definition 3, or there exists an
attribute s ∈ S for which property (ii) of Definition 3 holds. Note that this
includes the possibility of charging a different price for s(σ).
Lemma B.1 Fix a feasible outcome (b, s, b̃, s̃) and a uniform price pU . Suppose all buyers optimize at b given pU (i.e., (3) holds). If seller σ has no
extended profitable deviation, then he is optimizing at s given pU .
Proof. Suppose there exists a seller σ and attribute choice s0 ∈ S such that
ΠS (s(σ), σ) < ΠS (s0 , σ) = hS (b̃(s0 ), s0 ) + pU (s0 ) − cS (s0 , σ).
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Let ε = [ΠS (s0 , σ) − ΠS (s(σ), σ)]/4 > 0. Then, there exists δ > 0 such that
for all b ≥ b̃(s0 ) − δ,
hS (b, s0 ) + pU (s0 ) − cS (s0 , σ) > ΠS (s(σ), σ) + 3ε.

(B.1)

Denote by p00 the price for an attribute s00 that makes the buyer with attribute b̃(s0 ) indifferent between s0 (her equilibrium match) and s00 , i.e.,
hB (b̃(s0 ), s00 ) − p00 = hB (b̃(s0 ), s0 ) − pU (s0 ).
Choose s00 > s0 sufficiently close to s0 so that
hS (b, s00 ) − cS (s00 , σ) − hS (b, s0 ) + cS (s0 , σ) < ε,

∀b ∈ B,

(B.2)

holds and |p00 − pU (s0 )| < ε/2. From Assumption 1 (Supermodularity),
hB (b̃(s0 ) − δ, s00 ) − p00 < hB (b̃(s0 ) − δ, s0 ) − pU (s0 ).
For p̂ < p00 sufficiently close to p00 , we have p00 − p̂ > ε/2 and
hB (b̃(s0 ) − δ, s00 ) − p̂ < hB (b̃(s0 ) − δ, s0 ) − pU (s0 ).
Moreover the buyer with attribute b̃(s0 ) receives strictly higher payoff from
(s00 , p̂) than from (s0 , pU (s0 ))). Another application of Assumption 1 shows
that for all b ≤ b̃(s0 ) − δ,
hB (b, s00 ) − p̂ < hB (b, s0 ) − pU (s0 ).
From (3), for all b ∈ B,
hB (b, s0 ) − pU (s0 ) ≤ hB (b, s̃(b)) − pU (s̃(b)),
and so no buyer with attribute b ≤ b̃(s0 ) − δ finds (s00 , p̂) attractive. Thus,
the pair (s00 , p̂) is a profitable deviation for seller σ, since
hS (b̃(s0 ) − δ, s00 ) + p̂ − cS (s00 , σ) >hS (b̃(s0 ) − δ, s0 ) + p̂ − cS (s0 , σ) − ε
≥ΠS (s(σ), σ) + 3ε + (p̂ − p00 ) + (p00 − pU (s0 )) − ε
=ΠS (s(σ), σ) + ε,
where the first inequality follows from (B.2) and the second from (B.1).
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Proof of Proposition 1: Efficient Uniform Pricing

Let (b, s, b̃, s̃, pP ) be an efficient personalized-price equilibrium (see Section
E; existence is established in Proposition E.1). We first show that the price
function can be altered so that the seller is indifferent over buyer attributes.
In particular, (b, s, b̃, s̃, p̂P ) is a personalized-price equilibrium, where p̂P is
the personalized-price function given by
p̂P (b, s) = pP (b̃(s), s) + hS (b̃(s), s) − hS (b, s),

∀(b, s) ∈ B × S.

(C.1)

Moreover, under p̂P , the seller is indifferent over all marketed buyer attributes.
To verify this, note that seller indifference is immediate, and it is then
immediate that the seller is optimizing given p̂P . We then need show only
that the buyer is optimizing given pU . Suppose (E.1) fails at some β. Then,
for some (b, s) ∈ B × S and for sufficiently small ε > 0,
hB (b, s) − (p̂P (b, s) + ε) − cB (s, β) > ΠB (b(β), β).
Since no buyer has a profitable out-of-market deviation,
hS (b̃(s), s) + p̂P (b̃(s), s) ≥ hS (b, s) + p̂P (b, s) + ε.
But this, with (C.1), yields a contradiction.
We now notice that if hS (b, s) does not depend on b, then neither does
p̂P , implying that (b, s, b̃, s̃, pU ) for pU (s) = p̂P (·, s) is a uniform-price equilibrium.
The constrained efficiency of uniform-price equilibria when the seller
premuneration values do not depend on buyer attributes follows from the
observation that such equilibria are also personalized price equilibria and
Lemma E.2.

D

Proof of Proposition 3: Existence of Equilibrium.

The existence proof is involved and indirect. We would like to construct
a game Γ whose equilibria induce uniform-price equilibria. However, the
obvious such game Γ is itself difficult to handle, so we work with an approximating sequence of games Γn . We verify that each Γn has an equilibrium,
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take limits, and show that the limiting strategy profile induces a uniformprice equilibrium. Loosely, the n index allows us to accommodate (in the
limit) the possibility of jumps in the attribute-choice functions (precluded
in game Γn ).

D.1

Preliminaries

Let P = max{hB (b̄, s̄), hS (b̄, s̄)}. Then P is sufficiently large that no buyer
would be willing to purchase any seller attribute choice s ∈ [0, s̄] at a price
exceeding P , nor would any seller be willing to sell to a buyer b ∈ [0, b̄] at
price less than −P . We can thus limit prices to the interval [−P, P ].
Since buyer premuneration values are C 2 , there is a Lipschitz constant
∆ such that for all ε > 0, s ∈ [0, s̄ − ε], and b ∈ [0, b̄], we have hB (b, s + ε) −
hB (b, s) < ∆ε. As a result, given a choice between seller s and seller s + ε at
a price higher by ∆ε, buyers would always choose the former. Equilibrium
prices will thus never need to increase at a rate faster than ∆.

The game Γn

D.2

Each game Γn has three players, consisting of a buyer, a seller, and a pricesetter.
D.2.1

Strategy spaces

We begin by defining the strategy spaces for Γn .
The buyer chooses a pair of functions, (b, sB ), where b : [0, 1] → [0, b̄]
specifies a buyer attribute choice and sB : [0, 1] → [0, s̄] a seller attribute
with which to match, each as a function of the buyer’s type. We denote
the set of pairs of increasing functions (b, sB ) normed by the sum of the L1
norms on the component functions by ΥB . In Γn , the buyer is restricted to
the subset of ΥB , denoted by ΥnB , of functions satisfying (D.1) and (D.2):
(β 0 − β)/n ≤ b(β 0 ) − b(β) ≤ n(β 0 − β),

∀β < β 0 ∈ [0, 1],

(D.1)

and
(β 0 − β)/n ≤ sB (β 0 ) − sB (β) ≤ n(β 0 − β),

∀β < β 0 ∈ [0, 1].

(D.2)

The seller chooses an increasing function s, where s : [0, 1] → [0, s̄]
specifies a seller attribute choice as a function of seller’s type. We denote
the set of increasing functions s endowed with the L1 norm by ΥS . In Γn ,
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the seller is restricted to the subset of ΥS , denoted by ΥnS , of functions
satisfying (D.3),
(σ 0 − σ)/n ≤ s(σ 0 ) − s(σ) ≤ n(σ 0 − σ),

∀σ < σ 0 ∈ [0, 1].

(D.3)

The price-setter chooses an increasing function pU : [0, s̄] → [−P, P ]
satisfying
pU (s0 ) − pU (s) < 2∆(s0 − s)
(D.4)
for all s < s0 ∈ [0, s̄]. Denote the set of increasing functions pU satisfying
(D.4), endowed with the sup norm, by ΥP (note that ΥP is not indexed
by n). Every function in ΥP is continuous; indeed the collection ΥP is
equicontinuous.
The set Υ ≡ ΥB × ΥS × ΥP , when normed by the sum of the three
constituent norms, is a compact metric space.∗ It is immediate that Υn ≡
ΥnB × ΥnS × ΥP is a closed subset of Υ, and so also compact.
D.2.2

Buyer and Price-Setter Payoffs

The buyer. The buyer’s payoff from (b, sB ) ∈ ΥnB , when the price-setter
has chosen pU ∈ ΥP is
Z
(hB (b(β), sB (β)) − pU (sB (β)) − cB (b(β), β)) dβ.
(D.5)
Note that the buyer’s payoff is independent of seller behavior.
For any sB and s, define
FB (s) ≡ λ{β : sB (β) ≤ s}
and

FS (s) ≡ λ{σ : s(σ) ≤ s}.

∗
It suffices for this conclusion to show that Υ is sequentially compact, since sequential
compactness is equivalent to compactness for metric spaces (Dunford and Schwartz, 1988,
p. 20). An argument analogous to that of Helly’s theorem (Billingsley, 1986, Theorem
m
m
25.9) shows Υ is sequentially compact. In particular, given a sequence {(bm , sm
B , s , pU )},
we can choose a subsequence along which each function converges at every rational value
∞
∞
in its domain to a limit {(b∞ , s∞
B , s , pU )}. Because each function in the sequence
m m m
m
∞
∞
{(b , sB , s , pU )} is increasing, so must be each limiting function {(b∞ , s∞
B , s , pU )}.
This ensures convergence at every continuity point of the limit functions, and hence almost
m
everywhere for the functions bm , sm
and everywhere for the functions pm
B and s
U )}, sufficing (for bounded functions) for L1 convergence in the former three cases and convergence
in the sup norm in the latter.
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The price-setter. The price-setter’s payoff from pU ∈ ΥP , when the
buyer and seller have chosen (b, sB , s) ∈ ΥnB × ΥnS is given by
Z

s̄

pU (s) (FB (s) − FS (s)) ds.

(D.6)

0

Hence, the price-setter has an incentive to raise the price of seller attribute
choices in excess demand and lower the price of seller attribute choices in
excess supply.
D.2.3

Seller Payoffs

The specification of the seller’s payoff is complicated by the need to incorporate incentives arising from the possibility of profitable seller deviations to
attribute choices outside S. Given an attribute choice s, price p, and price
function pU , set


0
0
B(s, p, pU ) ≡ b ∈ [0, b̄] : hB (b, s) − p ≥ max {hB (b, s ) − pU (s )} .
s0 ∈[0,s̄]

(D.7)
Hence, B(s, p, pU ) is the set of buyer attributes that find attribute s at price
p (weakly) more attractive than any attribute s0 ∈ [0, s̄] at price pU (s0 ). Note
that since the buyer is constrained in Γn to choose seller attributes so that
(D.2) is satisfied, a maximizing buyer’s payoff from an attribute b (ignoring
costs) need not be given by maxs0 ∈[0,s̄] {hB (b, s0 ) − pU (s0 )}. Note also that
for all s and pU ∈ ΥP , since there is no a priori restriction on p, B(s, p, pU )
is nonempty for low p (possibly requiring p < −P , e.g., if pU ≡ −P ), and it
is empty if p > pU (s). Indeed, for sufficiently low p, B(s, p, pU ) = [0, b̄].
Lemma D.1 (1) If B(s, p, pU ) 6= ∅, then B(s, p, pU ) = [b1 , b2 ] with b1 ≤ b2 .
(2) For fixed s and pU , let p̄(s, pU ) ≡ sup{p : B(s, p, pU ) 6= ∅} and
write [b1 (p), b2 (p)] for B(s, p, pU ) when p ≤ p̄(s, pU ). Denote the set of
discontinuity points in the domain of bj (p) by Dj (s, pU ) (j = 1, 2). The set
{s : Dj (s, pU ) 6= ∅} has zero Lebesgue measure.
(3) Suppose {(s` , p` , p`U )}` is a sequence converging to (s, p, pU ) with ∅ 6=
B(s` , p` , p`U ) ≡ [b`1 , b`2 ]. Then B(s, p, pU ) 6= ∅, and so B(s, p, pU ) = [b1 , b2 ],
where
b1 ≤ lim inf ` b`1 ≤ lim sup` b`2 ≤ b2 .
(D.8)
(4) Moreover,if p 6∈ Dj (s, pU ) ∪ {p̄(s, pU )}, then bj = lim` b`j .
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Proof. (1) Suppose b1 , b2 ∈ B(s, p, pU ) with b1 < b2 , and b̂ 6∈ B(s, p, pU )
for some b̂ ∈ (b1 , b2 ). Then there exists ŝ ∈ [0, s̄] such that
hB (b̂, s) − p < hB (b̂, ŝ) − pU (ŝ).
If ŝ > s, then Assumption 1 implies
hB (b2 , ŝ) − hB (b2 , s) ≥ hB (b̂, ŝ) − hB (b̂, s)
> pU (ŝ) − p,
contradicting b2 ∈ B(s, p, pU ). Similarly, ŝ < s contradicts b1 ∈ B(s, p, pU ),
and so ŝ = s. But b2 ∈ B(s, p, pU ) then implies pU (s) ≥ p while b̂ 6∈
B(s, p, pU ) implies pU (s) < p, the final contradiction, and so b̂ ∈ B(s, p, pU ).
It is immediate that B(s, p, pU ) is closed.
(2) Since B(s, p0 , pU ) ⊃ B(s, p, pU ) for p0 < p, b1 (p) and b2 (p) are monotonic functions of p, and so are continuous except at a countable number of
points. Moreover, we can apply the maximum theorem (since each of the
functions in the maximum are continuous) to conclude that the right side of
the inequality in (D.7) is continuous in b, and so b1 and b2 are left-continuous
functions of p (as (D.7) features a weak inequality bounding p from above).
0
Suppose p ∈ D1 (s, pU ), and let b+
1 ≡ limp0 &p b1 (p ). Since b1 is left+
+
continuous, b1 (p) < b1 . Then for all b ∈ [b1 (p), b1 ],
hB (b, s) − p = max hB (b, s0 ) − pU (s0 ).
s0 ∈[0,s̄]

(D.9)

From the envelope theorem (Milgrom and Segal, 2002, Theorem 2), this
implies for all b ∈ (b1 (p), b+
1 ),
∂hB (b, s)
∂hB (b, s0 (b))
=
,
∂b
∂b
where s0 (b) ∈ arg maxs0 ∈[0,s̄] hB (b, s0 ) − pU (s0 ). Assumption 1 then implies
s = s0 (b) for all b ∈ (b1 (p), b+
1 ), and so p = pU (s).
00
Since b+
∈
B(s,
p
(s),
p
U
U ), for all s > s,
1
+
00
00
hB (b+
1 , s ) − hB (b1 , s) ≤ pU (s ) − pU (s)

so that

pU (s00 ) − pU (s)
∂hB (b+
1 , s)
≤ lim
inf
.
s00 >s
∂s
s00 − s

On the other hand, for all s0 < s,
pU (s) − pU (s0 ) ≤ hB (b1 (p), s) − hB (b1 (p), s0 ),
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so that
lim sup
s0 <s

pU (s) − pU (s0 )
∂hB (b1 (p), s)
≤
.
0
s−s
∂s

Consequently, since
∂hB (b+
∂hB (b1 (p), s)
1 , s)
<
,
∂s
∂s
the price function pU cannot be differentiable at s. Finally, since pU is a
monotonic function, it is differentiable almost everywhere (Billingsley, 1986,
Theorem 31.2), and hence {s : D1 (s, pU ) 6= ∅} has zero Lebesgue measure.
A similar argument shows that {s : D2 (s, pU ) 6= ∅} has zero Lebesgue
measure.
(3) Suppose {(s` , p` , p`U )}` is a sequence converging to (s, p, pU ), and let
`
{b } be a sequence of attributes with b` ∈ B(s` , p` , p`U ) for all `. By taking a
subsequence if necessary, we can assume {b` } is a convergent sequence with
limit b. Since
hB (b` , s` ) − p` ≥ max {hB (b` , s0 ) − p`U (s0 )},
s0 ∈[0,s̄]

∀`,

taking limits gives
hB (b, s) − p ≥ max {hB (b, s0 ) − pU (s0 )},
s0 ∈[0,s̄]

and so b ∈ B(s, p, pU ). Hence, from part 2 of the lemma, B(s, p, pU ) =
[b1 , b2 ], and (D.8) the follows from taking sequences {b` } with limits lim inf ` b`1
and ≤ lim sup` b`2 .
(4) Consider b2 and suppose p 6∈ D2 (s, pU ) ∪ {p̄(s, pU )} (and so p <
+
0
0
p̄(s, pU )). Hence, b2 = b+
2 ≡ limp0 &p b2 (p ). Consider b ∈ (b1 , b2 ). For p > p
sufficiently close to p, we have b ∈ B(s, p0 , pU ), and so
hB (b, s) − p > max {hB (b, s0 ) − pU (s0 )}.
s0 ∈[0,s̄]

Consequently, for ` sufficiently large,
hB (b, s` ) − p` > max {hB (b, s0 ) − pU (s0 )},
s0 ∈[0,s̄]

i.e., b ∈ B(s` , p` , p`U ). This implies that b`2 (p` ) ≥ b, and hence lim inf b`2 (p` ) ≥
`
`
b. Since this holds for all b ∈ (b+
1 , b2 ) and lim sup` b2 ≤ b2 , we have lim` b2 =
b2 . The argument for b1 is an obvious modification of this argument.
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Fix (s, p, pU ) and suppose λ({β : b(β) ∈ B(s, p, pU )}) > 0. Since b
is strictly increasing and continuous, it then follows from Lemma D.1 that
b([0, 1]) ∩ B(s, p, pU ) = [b01 , b02 ] for some 0 ≤ b01 < b02 ≤ b̄. The payoff to the
seller from (s, p, b, pU ) is given by
H(s, p, b, pU ) ≡ hS (b01 , s) + p.

(D.10)

This function depends upon pU and b through the dependence of b01 on
B(s, p, pU ) and b. For later reference, note that for fixed s, b, and pU ,
the function H(s, p, b, pU ) is continuous from the left in p (since b satisfies
(D.1) and both b1 (p) and b2 (p), defined just before Lemma D.1, are leftcontinuous).
We set
P̃ (s, b, pU ) ≡ {p : λ ({β : b(β) ∈ B(s, p, pU )}) > 0} ,
and noting that this set is nonempty, define
n
o
H̄(s, b, pU ) ≡ max supp∈P̃ (s,b,pU ) H(s, p, b, pU ), hS (0, s) + pU (s) .
(D.11)
Notice that if p ∈ P̃ (s, b, pU ) for all p < pU (s), then the first term in (D.11)
will be the maximum.†
The seller’s payoff from s ∈ ΥnS when the buyer and price-setter have
chosen (b, sB , pU ) ∈ ΥnB × ΥP is then
Z

H̄(s(σ), b, pU ) − cS (s(σ), σ) dσ.
(D.12)
Taking the maximum over supp∈P̃ (s,b,pU ) H(s, p, b, pU ) and hS (0, s) + pU (s)
effectively assumes that the seller can always sell attribute choice s at the
posted price pU (s), though perhaps only attracting buyer attribute choice
0.
Note that the seller, when considering the payoff implications of altering the attribute-choice function over an interval of seller types, can ignore
the seller types outside the interval, since feasibility of buyer responses is
irrelevant (the comparison in B for buyer attributes is always to her payoffs,
which is independent of seller behavior).
†

It need not be true that for s ∈ sB ([0, 1]), p ∈ P̃ (s, b, pU ) for all p < pU (s). Moreover,
we may have H̄(s, b, pU ) 6= hS (b(s−1
B (s)), s)+pU (s) (see the discussion just before Lemma
D.1).
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Equilibrium in game Γn

Our next task is to show that each game Γn has a Nash equilibrium, and that
the price-setter plays a pure strategy in any such equilibrium. To do this,
we first note that the price-setter’s payoff is concave in pU (note that the
buyer’s and sellers’s payoffs need not be even quasiconcave). If the payoff
functions in game Γn are continuous, then Glicksberg’s fixed point theorem,
applied to the game where we allow the buyer and seller to randomize, yields
a Nash equilibrium in which the buyer and seller may randomize, but the
price-setter does not.
Lemma D.2 The buyer, price-setter and seller payoff functions given by
(D.5),(D.6) and (D.12), are continuous functions of (b, sB , s, pU ) on Υn .
Proof. We first note that for increasing, bounded functions on a compact
set, L1 convergence implies convergence almost everywhere.‡
Consider first the buyer. The functions b, sB , and pU are bounded
functions on compact sets, and hence the absolute value of each of these
functions is dominated by an integrable function. The continuity of the
buyer’s payoff then follows immediately from Lebesgue’s dominated convergence theorem, if we can show that the convergence of b, pU , and sB in
the L1 norm (and hence almost everywhere) implies the convergence almost
everywhere of hB (b, sB ), pU (sB ), and cB (b(·), ·) (note that we are talking
about sequences of functions within a given game Γn ). The first and the
third of these follows from the continuity of hB and cB (from Assumptions
1 and 3), while for the remaining case it suffices to note that the collection
ΥP is equicontinuous.
Consider now the price-setter. Suppose s` converges in L1 , and so almost
everywhere, to s. Then FS` converges weakly to FS (and so a.e.).§ Similarly,
‡

Suppose {fn }n , with each fn increasing, converges in L1 norm to an increasing function f without converging almost everywhere. Then since f is discontinuous on a set of
measure zero, there exists (for example) a continuity point x of f with lim sup fn (x) > f (x)
(with the case lim inf fn (x) < f (x) analogous). The continuity of f at x then ensures
that for some point y > x, some ε > 0, all z ∈ [x, y] and for Rinfinitely many n, we have
fn (z) ≥ fn (x) ≥ f (y)+ε ≥ f (z)+ε. This in turn ensures that |fn (z)−f (z)|dz > (y−x)ε
infinitely often, precluding the L1 convergence of {fn }∞
n=1 to f .
§
Fix ε > 0. By Egoroff’s theorem (Royden, 1988, p.73), s` converges uniformly to s
on a set E of measure at least 1 − ε. Suppose s is a continuity point of FS . There then
exists δ > 0 such that |FS (s) − FS (s0 )| < ε for all |s − s0 | ≤ δ. There exists `0 such that,
for all σ ∈ E, for all ` > `0 , |s` (σ) − s(σ)| < δ. Consequently, FS` (s) = λ{σ : s` (σ) ≤ s} ≤
λ{σ : s(σ)−δ ≤ s}+ε = FS (s+δ)+ε and FS (s−δ)−ε ≤ FS` (s), and so |FS` (s)−FS (s)| < 2ε.
Hence, FS` converges weakly to FS .
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if s`B converges in L1 to sB , then FB` converges a.e. to FB . Continuity for the
price-setter’s payoff then follows from arguments analogous to those applied
to the buyer, since we have convergence almost everywhere of pU [FB − FS ].
Finally, we turn to the seller, where the proof of continuity is more
involved. It suffices to argue that H̄(s, b, pU ) is continuous in (s, b, pU )
for almost all s (since sB is irrelevant in the determination of the seller’s
payoff and the continuity with respect to s is then obvious, at which point
another appeal to Lebesgue’s dominated convergence theorem completes the
argument).
Fix a sequence (s` , b` , p`U ) converging to some point (ŝ, b̂, p̂U ). Since we
need continuity for only almost all s ∈ [0, s̄], we can assume D1 (ŝ, p̂U ) ∪
D2 (ŝ, p̂U ) = ∅ (or, equivalently, that p̂U is differentiable at ŝ, see the proof
of Lemma D.1.2). We thus need only prove the following claim.
Claim 1 lim`→∞ H̄(s` , b` , p`U ) = H̄(ŝ, b̂, p̂U ).
Proof. Since H̄ k (s, b, pU ) is the maximum of two terms, it suffices to show
that
lim supp∈P̃ (s` ,b` ,p` ) H(s` , p, b` , p`U ) =

`→∞

and

U

sup

H(ŝ, p, b̂, p̂U )

p∈P̃ (ŝ,b̂,p̂U )

lim hS (0, s` ) + p`U (s` ) = hS (0, ŝ) + p̂U (ŝ).

`→∞

The second is immediate from the continuity of hS and p̂U at ŝ.
We accordingly turn to the first. To conserve on notation, we define
¯ (s, b, p ).
supp∈P̃ (s,b,pU ) H(s, p, b, pU ) ≡ H̄
U
We first show that
¯ (s` , b` , p` ) ≥ H̄
¯ (ŝ, b̂, p̂ ).
lim inf H̄
U
U
`→∞

(D.13)

For all ε > 0 there exists p̂ ∈ P̃ (ŝ, b̂, p̂U ) such that
¯ (ŝ, b̂, p̂ ).
H(ŝ, p̂, b̂, p̂U ) + ε/2 ≥ H̄
U
Since H(ŝ, p, b̂, p̂U ) is continuous from the left in p, there exists p̂0 6∈ D1 (ŝ, p̂U )∪
D2 (ŝ, p̂U ) ∪ {p̄(ŝ, p̂U )} with p̂0 ≤ p̂ satisfying
|H(ŝ, p̂, b̂, p̂U ) − H(ŝ, p̂0 , b̂, p̂U )| < ε/2,
and so

¯ (ŝ, b̂, p̂ ).
H(ŝ, p̂0 , b̂, p̂U ) + ε ≥ H̄
U
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Since b̂ satisfies (D.1), for sufficiently large `, p̂0 ∈ P̃ (s` , b` , p`U ), and so
(applying Lemma D.1.3)
lim H(s` , p̂0 , b` , p`U ) = H(ŝ, p̂0 , b̂, p̂U ).

`→∞

Hence,

¯ (ŝ, b̂, p̂ ),
¯ (s` , b` , p` ) + ε ≥ H̄
lim inf H̄
U
U
`→∞

∀ε > 0,

yielding (D.13).
We now argue that
¯ (s` , b` , p` ),
¯ (ŝ, b̂, p̂ ) ≥ lim sup H̄
H̄
U
U

(D.14)

`→∞

which with (D.13) gives continuity.
Fix ε > 0. For each `, there exists p` ∈ P̃ (s` , b` , p`U ) such that
¯ (s` , b` , p` ).
H(s` , p` , b` , p`U ) + ε ≥ H̄
U

(D.15)

Without loss of generality, we can assume {p` }` is a convergent sequence,
with limit p̂. Suppose first that p̂ ∈ P̃ (ŝ, b̂, p̂U ). If p̂ 6= {p̄(ŝ, p̂U )}, it is
immediate that
¯ (s` , b` , p` ),
H(ŝ, p̂, b̂, p̂U ) + ε ≥ lim sup H̄
U

(D.16)

`→∞

which (since it holds for all ε) implies (D.14).
Suppose now that p̂ 6∈ P̃ (ŝ, b̂, p̂U ) or p = p̄(ŝ, p̂U ). Since p̂U is differentiable at ŝ, there cannot be a nondegenerate interval of buyer attributes
indifferent between (ŝ, p̂) and the unconstrained optimal seller attribute under p̂U . This implies b̂([0, 1]) ∩ B(ŝ, p̂, p̂U ) = {b̂} for some b̂, and so
¯ (ŝ, b̂, p̂ ) ≥ h (b̂, ŝ) + p̂.
H̄
U
S
From Lemma D.1.3,
lim H(s` , p` , b` , p`U ) + ε = hS (b̂, ŝ) + p̂ + ε,

`→∞

and so (taking the lim sup of both sides of (D.15))
¯ (s` , b` , p` ),
¯ (ŝ, b̂, p̂ ) + ε ≥ lim sup H̄
H̄
U
U
`→∞

which (since it holds for all ε > 0) implies (D.14).
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Allowing the buyer and seller to choose mixed strategies then gives us
a game whose best responses consist of closed, convex sets. As a result, we
can apply Glicksberg (1952) to conclude that we have a Nash equilibrium in
which the price-setter plays a pure strategy, while the buyer and seller may
mix:
Lemma D.3 The game Γn has a Nash Equilibrium, (ξ nB , ξ nS , pnU ) ∈ ∆(ΥB )×
∆(ΥS ) × ΥP .

D.4

The limit n → ∞

We now examine the limit as n → ∞. In particular, let {(ξ nB , ξ nS , pnU )}n ⊂
∆(ΥB ) × ∆(ΥS ) × ΥP be a sequence of Nash equilibria of the games Γn .
Without loss of generality (since the relevant spaces are sequentially compact), we may assume that both the sequence of equilibria converges to some
limit (ξ ∗B , ξ ∗S , p∗U ), and that players’ payoffs also converge.
We examine the limit (ξ ∗B , ξ ∗S , p∗U ). Intuitively, we would like to think of
this profile as the equilibrium of a “limit game.” However, the definition
of this limit game is not straightforward, since the definition of the seller’s
payoffs in the game Γn relies on the strategies b, sB , and s having properties
(such as strict monotonicity and continuity) that need not carry over to their
limits. In establishing properties of (ξ ∗B , ξ ∗S , p∗U ), we accordingly typically
begin our argument in the limit, and then pass back to the approximating
equilibrium profile (ξ nB , ξ nS , pnU ) to obtain a contradiction. The latter step of
the argument is notationally cumbersome, and we do not always make the
approximation explicit.
Note that while the seller is best responding to ξ nB in choosing s, the
choice of p implicit in (D.11) is made after (b, sB ) is realized.
While the L1 topology does not distinguish between functions that agree
almost everywhere, it will be important for some of the later developments
that we make the selection indicated in the next lemma from the equivalence
classes of functions that agree almost everywhere.
Lemma D.4 The limit profile (ξ ∗B , ξ ∗S , p∗U ) is pure, which we denote by
(b∗ , s∗B , s∗ , p∗U ). The limit functions can be (and subsequently are) taken
to be increasing, and the functions b∗ , s∗B , and s∗ can be (and subsequently
are) taken to be continuous from the left.
Proof. Consider the buyer (the case of the seller is analogous). Toward a
contradiction, suppose the buyer’s strategy (ξ ∗B , ξ ∗S ) is not pure. Let ξ ∗B,b and
ξ ∗B,s denote the marginal distributions induced on buyer and seller attributes

Appendix

16

chosen by the buyer. Then define a pair of increasing functions b0 : [0, 1] →
[0, b̄] and s0B : [0, 1] → [0, s̄] by
b0 (β) = inf{b : ξ ∗B,b (b) ≥ β}
and

s0B (β) = inf{s : ξ ∗B,s (s) ≥ β}.

These functions constitute pure strategies for the buyer giving the same
distribution of buyer and seller attributes chosen by the buyer. (For example, for any set [b, b] of buyer attributes with b > 0, ξ ∗B,b [b, b] = β 00 − β 0 ,
where b0 (β 00 ) = b and b0 (β 0 ) = b.) However, the b0 and s0B feature positive
assortativity between the buyer’s types and attribute choice, and between
the buyer’s and the seller’s attribute with which the buyer matches, while
ξ ∗B,b and ξ ∗B,s , being mixed, do not. From Assumptions 1 and 3, this positive assortativity increases the buyer’s payoff, and so the constructed pure
strategy strictly increases the buyer’s payoff. It then follows from straightforward continuity arguments that for sufficiently large n, i.e., for a game in
which the slope requirements on the buyer’s strategy are sufficiently weak
and the equilibrium profile (ξ nB , ξ nS , pnU ) is sufficiently close to (ξ ∗B , ξ ∗S , p∗U ),
there is a pure strategy sufficiently close to b0 and s0B giving the buyer a
payoff higher than his supposed equilibrium payoff in Γn a contradiction.
Hence, the buyer cannot mix.
The conclusion that each function is increasing is an implication of the
observation that if a sequence of increasing functions {fn } converges in L1
to a function f , then that function is increasing.
It is helpful to keep in mind the nature of convergence in ∆(ΥB ) ×
∆(ΥS ) × ΥP . Recalling that ΥB , ΥS , are each endowed with the L1 norm
and ΥP with the sup norm, and the definition of the Prohorov metric
(which metrizes weak convergence), (ξ nB , ξ nS , pnU ) converges to the pure profile (b∗ , s∗B , s∗ , p∗U ) if, and only if, the following holds: For all ε > 0 there
exists n0 such that for all n ≥ n0 ,
ξ nB




R
R
(b, sB ) ∈ ΥnB : |b(β) − b∗ (β)|dβ < ε,
|sB (β) − s∗B (β)|dβ < ε
≥ 1 − ε,
ξ nS




R
s ∈ ΥnS : |s(σ) − s∗ (σ)|dσ < ε ≥ 1 − ε,

and
sup |pnU (s) − p∗U (s)| < ε.
We next restate the nature of convergence in a more useful form:

Appendix

17

Lemma D.5 For all ε > 0, there exists a set E ε ⊂ [0, 1] with λ(E ε ) ≥ 1 − ε
and nε such that for all n ≥ nε ,
ξ nB ({(b, sB ) ∈ ΥnB : |b(β) − b∗ (β)| < ε, |sB (β) − s∗B (β)| < ε, ∀β ∈ E ε })
≥ 1 − ε,
ξ nS ({s ∈ ΥnS : |s(σ) − s∗ (σ)| < ε, ∀σ ∈ E ε }) ≥ 1 − ε,
and
|pnU (s) − p∗U (s)| < ε, ∀s.
0

Moreover, the sets E ε are nested: E ε ⊂ E ε if ε < ε0 .
Proof. Fix ε > 0. We prove that there is a set ESε with λ(ESε ) > 1 − ε/3
and an integer n0S such that
ξ nS ({s ∈ ΥnS : |s(σ) − s∗ (σ)| < ε, ∀σ ∈ ESε }) ≥ 1 − ε

(D.17)

ε and integer n0 for
for all n > n0S . The same argument implies a set EB
B
ε and n00 for the function s∗ .¶ The desired set is
the function b∗ , and a ÊB
B
B
ε ∩ Ê ε and integer is n = max{n0 , n0 , n00 }.
E ε = ESε ∩ EB
ε
B
S
B
B
Let {σ k } be an enumeration of the discontinuities of s∗ . Since s∗ is
bounded, there exists K such that the total size of the discontinuities over
{σ k }k>K is less than ε/6.
Fix L > 2 such that {(σ k − 2−kL , σ k + 2−kL )}K
k=1 is pairwise disjoint and
1−L
2
< ε/6. Defining
[
ESε = [0, 1] \ (σ k − 2−kL , σ k + 2−kL )
k

yields a set of measure at least 1 − ε/3.
k
−kL , σ k + 2−kL ); clearly
Let ESK be the set given by [0, 1] \ ∪K
k=1 (σ − 2
ε
K
K
ES ⊂ ES . The set ES can be written as the disjoint union of closed intervals
¶

More precisely, the sets can be chosen so that, for n > n0B ,
n
∗
ε
ξn
B ({(b, sB ) ∈ ΥB : |b(β) − b (β)| < ε, ∀β ∈ EB }) ≥ 1 − ε/2,

and, for n > n00B ,
n
∗
ε
ξn
B ({(b, sB ) ∈ ΥB : |sB (β) − sB (β)| < ε, ∀β ∈ ÊB }) ≥ 1 − ε/2,

so that, for n > max{n0B , n00B },
n
∗
∗
ε
ε
ξn
B ({(b, sB ) ∈ ΥB : |b(β) − b (β)| < ε, |sB (β) − sB (β)| < ε, ∀β ∈ EB ∩ ÊB }) ≥ 1 − ε.
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Ik , k = 0, 1, . . . , K. There exists an η > 0 such that for all k and for all
σ, σ 0 ∈ Ik , if |σ − σ 0 | < η then |s∗ (σ) − s∗ (σ 0 )| < ε/3.
Let {x` } ⊂ Ik be an η-grid of Ik , i.e., x`+1 −Rη < x` < x`+1 for all `.
Consider an increasing function s satisfying |s − s∗ | < εη/3. We claim
∗ | < ε. Observe that (D.17)
that for all σ ∈ ESK (and so for all σ ∈ ESε ), |s−s


R
then follows, since n0S can be chosen so that ξ nS s ∈ ΥnS : |s − s∗ | < εη/3 ≥
1 − ε holds for all n > n0S .
The claim follows from two observations:
1. |s(x` ) − s∗ (x` )| < 2ε/3: Suppose s(x` ) ≥ s∗ (x` ) + 2ε/3 (the other
possibility is handled mutatis mutandis). Then, for all σ ∈ (x` , x`+1 ),
s(σ) ≥ s(x` ) ≥ s∗ (x` ) + 2ε/3 > s∗ (σ) + ε/3.
R
But this is impossible, since it would imply |s − s∗ | > εη/3.
2. For all ` and all σ ∈ (x` , x`+1 ), |s(σ) − s∗ (σ)| < ε: Suppose s(σ) ≥
s∗ (σ) + ε (the other possibility is handled mutatis mutandis). Then,
s(x`+1 ) ≥ s(σ) ≥ s∗ (σ) + ε ≥ s∗ (x`+1 ) + 2ε/3,
contradicting the previous observation.
The last assertion of Lemma D.5 is immediate from the definition of ESε .

Lemma D.6 The profile (b∗ , s∗B , s∗ , p∗U ) balances the market, i.e., FB∗ (s) =
FS∗ (s) for all s. Hence, s∗B (x) = s∗ (x) for almost all x ∈ [0, 1].
Proof. Since FB∗ and FS∗ are continuous from the right, it suffices to show
that they agree almost everywhere. We first argue that FB∗ (s) − FS∗ (s) ≤ 0
almost everywhere. Suppose this is not the case, so there exists ŝ < s̄ with
FB∗ (ŝ) − FS∗ (ŝ) = ε > 0 and with ŝ a continuity point of FB∗ − FS∗ . Then
there exists s1 and s2 with ŝ ∈ (s1 , s2 ), FB∗ (s) − FS∗ (s) ≥ ε/2 on [s1 , s2 ],
and either s1 = 0 or, for every η > 0, there is a value sη ∈ [s1 − η, s1 ) with
FB∗ (sη ) − FS∗ (sη ) < ε/2 (note that FB∗ (sη ) − FS∗ (sη ) may be negative, and
so is bounded below by −1). We consider the case in which s1 > 0 and
p∗U (s1 ) < p∗U (s2 ), with the remaining cases a straightforward simplification.
Since FB∗ (s) − FS∗ (s) > 0 on [s1 , s2 ], for fixed p∗U (s1 ) and p∗U (s2 ), the
price-setter must be setting prices as large as possible on this interval. If
not, there is a price function p̂U ∈ ΥP with p̂U (s) ≥ p∗U (s) for all s and
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p̂U (s) > p∗U (s) for some s yielding strictly higher payoffs to the price-setter
than p∗U in Γn for sufficiently large n, when the buyer and seller choose
(ξ nB , ξ nS ). But this contradicts the equilibrium property of (ξ nB , ξ nS , pnU ).
Hence, there exists s0 ∈ [s1 , s2 ] such that dp∗U (s)/ds = 2∆ on (s1 , s0 ) and
∗
pU (s) = p∗U (s2 ) for s ∈ [s0 , s2 ]. That is, prices increase at the maximum
rate possible until hitting p∗U (s2 ) (with s0 = s2 possible, but since p∗U (s1 ) <
p∗U (s2 ), we have s1 < s0 ). Consequently, sB ([0, 1]) ∩ [s1 , s2 ] ⊂ {s1 , s2 }, i.e.,
buyers demand only seller attribute choices s1 and s2 from this interval.
(Since all seller attribute choices in [s0 , s2 ] command the same price, buyers
demand only attribute choice s2 from this set, while the price of a seller
attribute choice increases sufficiently quickly on [s1 , s0 ] that from this set
buyers demand only s1 .)
Since for every η > 0, there exists sη ∈ [s1 −η, s1 ) with FB∗ (sη )−FS∗ (sη ) <
ε/2 and yet FB∗ (s1 )−FS∗ (s1 ) ≥ ε, the buyer must choose attributes arbitrarily
close to s1 for some buyer types. This implies that there is a range of seller
attributes just below s1 with prices that are not too low, that is, there exists
η 0 > 0 such that
p∗U (s) > p∗U (s1 ) − ∆(s1 − s)
for all s ∈ [s1 − η 0 , s1 ). Consider now the price function pηU ∈ ΥP given by

∗

if s ≥ s0 ,
pU (s),
pηU (s) ≡ min{p∗U (s1 − η) + 2∆(s − s1 + η), p∗U (s0 )}, if s ∈ (s1 − η, s0 ),

 ∗
pU (s),
if s ≤ s1 − η,
and note that p0U = p∗U . Since pηU ≥ p∗U , the price-setter’s payoff from
choosing pηU ∈ ΥP less the payoff from p∗U is bounded below by
Z

s1

−
s1 −η


pηU (s) − p∗U (s) ds +

Z

s0

s1


pηU (s) − p∗U (s) ε/2 ds.

(D.18)

For η < η 0 and s ∈ (s1 − η, s1 ),
pηU (s) − p∗U (s) ≤ p∗U (s1 − η) + 2∆(s − s1 + η) − p∗U (s1 ) + ∆(s1 − s)
= p∗U (s1 − η) − p∗U (s1 ) − ∆(s1 − s) + 2∆η
≤ 2∆η.
Moreover, for s ∈ (s1 , s1 + (s0 − s1 )/2), if η is sufficiently close to 0, we have
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pηU (s) < p∗U (s0 ) and so
pηU (s) − p∗U (s) = p∗U (s1 − η) + 2∆(s − s1 + η) − p∗U (s)
≥ p∗U (s1 ) − ∆η + 2∆(s − s1 + η) − p∗U (s)
= p∗U (s1 ) − ∆η + 2∆(s − s1 + η) − p∗U (s1 ) − 2∆(s − s1 )
= ∆η.
Since pηU (s) ≥ p∗U (s) for all s, the expression in (D.18) is bounded below by
Z

s1

−

Z

s1 +(s0 −s1 )/2

2∆η ds +
s1 −η

∆ηε/2 ds,
s1

which is clearly positive for sufficiently small η. Since the lower bound is
strictly positive, the price-setter has a profitable deviation (in Γn for large
n), a contradiction.
We conclude that FB∗ (s) − FS∗ (s) ≤ 0 for almost all s. It remains to
argue that it is not negative on a set of positive measure. Suppose it is.
Then there must exist a seller characteristic ŝ > 0 such that pU (s) = −P
for s < ŝ, FB∗ (s) − FS∗ (s) < 0 for a positive-measure subset of [0, ŝ], and
FB∗ (s) − FS∗ (s) = 0 for almost all s > ŝ. But then no seller would choose
attributes in [0, ŝ), a contradiction.
We now seek a characterization of the seller’s payoffs. Intuitively, we
would like to use Lemma D.6 and the monotonicity of b∗ and s∗B to conclude
that there is positive assortative matching, and indeed that a seller of type
σ matches with a buyer of type β = σ. However, these properties may not
hold if b∗ and s∗B are not strictly increasing. Moreover, even if we had such
a matching, the specification of the seller’s payoffs given by (D.12) leaves
open the possibility that the (gross) payoff to a seller of type σ choosing
attribute s may not be given by hS (b̃(s), s) + pU (s). Hence, the buyers that
sellers are implicitly choosing in their payoff calculations may not duplicate
those whose seller choices balance the market.
Our first step in addressing these issues is to show that the buyer’s
limiting attribute-choice function is indeed strictly increasing. Intuitively, if
a positive measure of buyer types choose the same attribute, by having some
higher types in the pool choose a slightly higher attribute, and some lower
types choose a slightly lower attribute, we can keep the average attribute
unchanged, while saving costs (from Assumption 3).
Lemma D.7 The function b∗ is strictly increasing when nonzero.
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Proof. By construction, b∗ is weakly increasing. We show that β 00 > β 0
and b∗ (β 0 ) > 0 imply b∗ (β 00 ) > b∗ (β 0 ). Suppose to the contrary that b =
b∗ (β) > 0 for two distinct values of β.
Define β 1 ≡ inf{β : b∗ (β) = b}, β 2 ≡ sup{β : b∗ (β) = b}, and β̄ =
(β 1 + β 2 )/2. We assume 0 < β 1 and β 2 < 1 (if equality holds in either case,
then the argument is modified in the obvious manner). We now define a
new attribute-choice function (as a function of a parameter η > 0) that is
strictly increasing on a neighborhood of [β 1 , β 2 ] and agrees with b∗ outside
that neighborhood. First, define
β η1 = inf{β ≤ β 1 : b∗ (β) ≥ b + η(β − β̄)}
β η2 = sup{β ≥ β 2 : b∗ (β) ≤ b + η(β − β̄)}.

and

Note that as η → 0, β ηj → β j for j = 1, 2.

∗

b (β),
bη (β) ≡ b + η(β − β̄),

 ∗
b (β),

Finally, define
if β > β η2 ,
if β ∈ [β η1 , β η2 ],
if β < β η1 .

The difference in payoffs to the buyer under bη and under b∗ is given by
Z βη
2
hB (bη (β), s∗B (β))−hB (b∗ (β), s∗B (β))−[cB (bη (β), β)−cB (b∗ (β), β)] dβ.
β η1

(D.19)
Now,
Z β2

[cB (bη (β),β) − cB (b∗ (β), β)] dβ

β1
β2




∂cB (b, β)
=
η(β − β̄) + o(η) dβ
∂b
β1

Z (β 2 −β 1 )/2 
∂cB (b, β̄ + x) ∂cB (b, β̄ − x)
=η
−
x dx + o(η).
∂b
∂b
0
Z

From Assumption 3, the integrand is strictly negative, and so the integral
is strictly negative and independent of η. Since s∗B is increasing, a similar
argument applied to the difference in the premuneration values shows that
Z β2
hB (bη (β), s∗B (β))−hB (b∗ (β), s∗B (β))−[cB (bη (β), β)−cB (b∗ (β), β)] dβ
β1

Z
≥η
0

(β 2 −β 1 )/2 


∂cB (b, β̄ − x) ∂cB (b, β̄ + x)
−
x dβ + o(η).
∂b
∂b
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It remains to argue that the contribution to (D.19) from the intervals [β η1 , β 1 )
and (β 2 , β η2 ] is of order o(η). But this is immediate, since |bη (β)−b∗ (β)| ≤ η
and β ηj → β j as η → 0 (for j = 1, 2). Hence, for η > 0 sufficiently small,
bη gives the buyer a strictly higher payoff under (D.5) than b∗ . But, then
by a now familiar argument, the buyer has a profitable deviation in Γn
for sufficiently large n, a contradiction. So b∗ is strictly increasing when
nonzero.
We next show that the seller’s payoffs converge to the payoff one would
expect the seller to receive by matching with his corresponding buyer type.
Lemma D.8 For almost all σ satisfying b∗ (σ) > 0,
Z
lim
n

H̄(s(σ), b, pnU ) − cS (s(σ), σ)dξ n
= hS (b∗ (σ)), s∗ (σ)) + p∗U (s∗ (σ)) − cS (s∗ (σ), σ).

The functions s and b on the left side of this expression are strategies in the
game Γn , and are the objects over which the equilibrium ξ n mixes.
Proof. Suppose the claim is false. Then, since the limit exists, there exists
n00 and η > 0 such that for all σ in a set G of sellers of measure at least η
whose “matched” buyers choose positive attributes (i.e., b∗ (σ) > 0), for all
n > n00 ,
Z
H̄(s(σ), b, pnU ) − cS (s(σ), σ)dξ n

is at least η distant from
hS (b∗ (σ), s∗ (σ)) + p∗U (s∗ (σ)) − cS (s∗ (σ), σ).
Since G has positive measure, we may assume that every index in G is
a continuity point of the limit functions (b∗ , s∗B , s∗ ).
For any ε > 0, let E ε ⊂ [0, 1] be the set from Lemma D.5 satisfying
λ(E ε ) ≥ 1 − ε.
0
Fix an index σ 0 ∈ G ∩ E ε for some ε0 > 0 (since E ε is monotonic in ε,
σ 0 ∈ G ∩ E ε for all smaller ε). Since b∗ is strictly increasing, without loss
of generality, we may assume that, for all ζ > 0, there is a positive measure
set of buyers with b∗ (β) ∈ (b∗ (σ 0 ) − ζ, b∗ (σ 0 )). Indeed, a positive measure
set of buyers in E ε does so for all ε sufficiently small. Formally,
∀ζ > 0 ∃ε00 ∀ε < ε00 , λ{β ∈ E ε : b∗ (β) ∈ (b∗ (σ 0 ) − ζ, b∗ (σ 0 ))} > 0. (D.20)
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Consider some ε < ε0 and suppose n > max{nε , n00 }, where nε is from
Lemma D.5. Let (b, sB , s) ∈ ΥnB × ΥnS be a triple of functions with the
property that |b(β) − b∗ (β)| < ε and |sB (β) − s∗B (β)| < ε for all β ∈ E ε ,
and |s(σ) − s∗ (σ)| < ε for all σ ∈ E ε . (Recall that, from Lemma D.5, ξ n
assigns high probability to such functions for large n.)
By Lemma D.6, s∗ and s∗B are equal almost surely, so without loss of
generality, we may assume that s∗ (x) = s∗B (x) for all x ∈ E.
Observe first that if the max in (D.11) is achieved by hS (0, s(σ)) +
n
pU (s(σ)), then
H̄(s(σ), b, pnU ) − cS (s(σ), σ) = hS (0, s(σ)) + pnU (s(σ)) − cS (s(σ), σ)
≤ hS (b(σ), s(σ)) + pnU (s(σ)) − cS (s(σ), σ).
We claim that, for sufficiently small ε > 0, the set P̃ (s(σ), b, pnU ) contains
all p < pnU (s(σ)). This follows from (D.20) and the observation that buyers
in E ε receive a payoff (ignoring costs) arbitrarily close to hB (b∗ (β), s∗ (β)) −
p∗U (s∗ (β)).
Consequently, for p sufficiently close to pnU (s(σ)), single crossing (Assumption 1) implies that a buyer β with attribute satisfying b∗ (β) < b∗ (σ)
will not be attracted (for sufficiently large n). This implies that
sup

H(s(σ), p, b, pnU ) = hS (b(σ), s(σ)) + pnU (s(σ)).

p∈P̃ (s(σ),b,pn
U)

By choosing ε small (or, equivalently, n large), the right side can be made
arbitrarily close to
hS (b1 (s0 ), s0 ) + p∗U (s0 ) = hS (b1 (s∗ (σ)), s∗ (σ)) + p∗U (s∗ (σ)).
Hence, the max in (D.11) is achieved by the first term, and we have a
contradiction.
With this payoff characterization in hand, we can show that seller attribute choices are strictly increasing in types (when positive), as are the
types of sellers with whom buyers attempt to match.
Lemma D.9 The functions s∗B and s∗ are strictly increasing on {β : b∗ (β) >
0}.
Proof. From Lemma D.6, s∗B (x) = s∗ (x) for almost all x ∈ [0, 1], and so it
suffices to prove the result for s∗ . Suppose to the contrary there is a strictly
positive constant ŝ and associated maximal nondegenerate interval (σ 1 , σ 2 )
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with s∗ (σ) = ŝ and b∗ (σ) > 0 for all σ ∈ (σ 1 , σ 2 ). From Lemma D.6, we
also have s∗B (β) = ŝ for all β ∈ (σ 1 , σ 2 ).
Define b1 ≡ limβ↓σ1 b∗ (β) and b2 ≡ limβ↑σ2 b∗ (β).
Define σ(η) ≡ inf{σ : s∗ (σ) ≥ ŝ + η}, and notice that limη→0 σ(η) = σ 2 .
The seller attribute-choice function s0 given by
 ∗
s (σ), if σ 6∈ (σ 1 , σ(η)),
0
s (s) =
ŝ + η, if σ ∈ (σ 1 , σ(η)),
is weakly increasing. Consider the price p̂ > p∗U (ŝ) for attribute ŝ + η
satisfying
p̂ = sup{p : B(ŝ + η, p, p∗U ) 6= ∅}.
(This is p̄(ŝ + η, p, p∗U ) from Lemma D.1(1).) The price p̂ is at least as high
as the value p0 satisfying hB (b2 , ŝ) − pU (ŝ) = hB (b2 , ŝ + η) − p0 . At the price
p̂ for attribute choice ŝ + η, the seller ensures that attribute choice ŝ + η
is chosen by a buyer at least as high as b2 (the single-crossing condition
on buyer premuneration values ensures that no lower attribute buyers will
choose ŝ + η). From Lemma D.8, we have then have that the switch to
attribute-choice function s0 increases the seller’s payoff by at least
Z σ2
Z σ2
(hS (b2 , ŝ + η) + p̂) dσ −
(hS (b1 , ŝ) + p∗U (ŝ)) dσ
σ1

σ1

Z

σ(η)

−

(cs (ŝ + η, σ) − cS (s∗ (σ), σ)dσ

σ1

> (σ 2 − σ 1 )[hS (b2 , ŝ + η) − hS (b1 , ŝ]
− (σ(η) − σ 1 )[cS (ŝ + η, σ 1 ) − cS (ŝ, σ 1 )].
The first term after the inequality is bounded away from zero as η approaches
zero, while the second approaches zero as does η, ensuring that there is some
η > 0 for which the payoff difference is positive. Intuitively, each seller in
the interval (σ 1 , σ 2 ) experiences a discontinuous increase in expected buyer
(at a higher price) when increasing her attribute choice, while sellers in the
interval (σ 2 , σ(η)) experience a continuous increase in cost. The attributechoice function s0 increases the seller’s payoff for sufficiently small η, yielding
the result.
The limiting mass of buyers and seller choosing zero attributes are equal:
Lemma D.10
λ({σ : s∗ (σ) = 0}) = λ({β : b∗ (β) = 0}).
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Proof. First, suppose λ({β : b∗ (β) = 0}) > λ({σ : s∗ (σ) = 0}). Then
because s∗B = s∗ almost everywhere, there exists a positive mass of buyers
for whom b∗ (β) = 0 and s∗B (β) > 0. By Assumption 2, hB (0, s) is independent of s, and so, since p∗U is strictly increasing, the buyers choosing
b = 0 can increase their payoff by choosing s = 0. The buyer’s equilibrium
strategy must then be suboptimal in the game Γn for sufficiently large n, a
contradiction.
Now, suppose λ({β : b∗ (β) = 0}) < λ({σ : s∗ (σ) = 0}). Then there
exists a positive mass of buyers for whom b∗ (β) > 0 and s∗B (β) = 0. By
Lemma D.6, there is then a positive mass of buyers choosing a zero seller
attribute and positive buyer attribute. Since hB (b, 0) is independent of b
(Assumption 2) and cB (b, β) is strictly increasing in b, such buyers can increase their payoff by choosing b = 0. The buyer’s equilibrium strategy must
then be suboptimal in the game Γn for sufficiently large n, a contradiction.
We now turn to feasible matchings. For b ∈ [0, b∗ (1)] and s ∈ [0, s∗ (1)],
we define
(
b∗ ((s∗ )−1 (s)),
s ∈ s∗ ([0, 1]), s > 0,
b̃∗ (s) ≡
max {0, supb∈B {b < b∗ (inf {σ : s∗ (σ) > s})}} , otherwise,
and
(
s∗ ((b∗ )−1 (b)),
b ∈ b∗ ([0, 1]), b > 0,
s̃∗ (b) ≡
max {0, sups∈S {s < s∗ (inf{β : b∗ (β) > b})}} , otherwise.
The maximum in the specification of b̃∗ (with s̃∗ similar) ensures that b̃∗ is
well defined when s∗ is continuous at inf{σ|s∗ (σ) > 0} (in which case, the
supremum is taken over the empty set and so has value −∞).
Lemma D.11 The pair (b̃∗ , s̃∗ ) is a feasible matching. In addition, for all
values b > 0 and s > 0, we have
s̃∗ (b) = s∗ ((b∗ )−1 (b))
where
∗ −1

(b )

(
inf{β : b∗ (β) > b},
(b) =
1,

for b ≤ b∗ (1),
for b > b∗ (1),

and
b̃∗ (s) = b∗ ((s∗ )−1 (s)),
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(
inf{σ : s∗ (σ) > s},
(s∗ )−1 (s) =
1,

for s ≤ s∗ (1),
for s > s∗ (1).

Proof. From Lemma D.10, we can assume that b∗ and s∗ share a common
set [0, x] on which they are zero. It is then immediate that (b̃∗ , s̃∗ ) is a
feasible matching.
The final two statements follow immediately from the left continuity of
the attribute-choice functions (see Lemma D.4) and the definitions of s̃∗ and
b̃∗ .
Finally, we show that the seller’s payoff satisfies an optimality condition.
Lemma D.12 For almost all σ,
Z
lim H̄(s(σ), b, pnU ) − cS (s(σ), σ)dξ n
n

= hS (b∗ (σ), s∗ (σ)) + p∗U (s∗ (σ)) − cS (s∗ (σ), σ)
= max hS (b̃∗ (s), s) + p∗U (s) − cS (s, σ).
s∈S

Proof. The first inequality duplicates Lemma D.8.
Single-crossing (Assumption 3) implies that the attribute choices maximizing hS (b̃∗ (s), s)+p∗U (s)−cS (s, σ) are increasing in σ, and so if the second
equality fails, in games Γn for sufficiently large n, the seller has a profitable
deviation.

D.5

Uniform-Price Equilibria

We finally argue that the profile (b∗ , s∗ , b̃∗ , s̃∗ , p∗U ) induces a uniform-price
equilibrium of the matching market with identical attribute choices and
matching function (but perhaps a vertical shift in the price function).
The first task is to show that equilibrium payoffs are nonnegative, so
that agents would not prefer to be out of the market. Suppose {ξ nB , ξ nS , pnU }n
is the sequence whose limit induces (b∗ , s∗B , b̃∗ , s̃∗ , p∗U ). We have
hB (0, 0) − p∗U (0) = hB (0, 0) − p∗U (0) − cB (0, β)
≤ hB (b(β), s̃∗ (b∗ (β))) − p∗U (s̃∗ (b∗ (β))) − cB (b(β), β) (D.21)
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and
hS (0, 0) + p∗U (0) = hS (0, 0) + p∗U (0) − cS (0, σ)
≤ hS (b̃∗ (s(σ)), s(σ)) + p∗U (s(σ)) − cS (s(σ), σ). (D.22)
Let
κ∗ ≡ hB (0, 0) − p∗U (0) ≥ −hS (0, 0) − p∗U (0)
(where the inequality follows from Assumption 2) and replace the price
function p∗U with p∗U + κ∗ . Both ξ nB and ξ nS remain best responses given price
pnU + κ∗ and markets still clear in the limit of n → ∞. Moreover, replacing
p∗U with p∗U + κ∗ in (D.21)–(D.22) gives nonnegative payoffs.
It is immediate from the formulation of the buyer’s payoffs in the game
and from Lemma D.12 that almost all buyers and sellers are optimizing
given p∗U .
It remains to consider deviations by a seller of type σ to a value s not
chosen by any seller under s∗ . If there is a profitable such deviation for
seller σ, then there is a price p such that B(s, p, p∗U ) is nonempty and for all
b ∈ B(s, p, p∗U ),
ΠS (s∗ (σ), σ) < hS (b, s) + p − cS (s, σ).
But then for all sufficiently large n, B(s, p0 , pnU ) is again nonempty for p0
less
the fact that ΠS (s∗ (σ), σ) is close to
R than but nclose to p, contradicting
n
H̄(s(σ), b, pU ) − cS (s(σ), σ) dξ .

D.6

Nontriviality

Partial nontriviality. We now show that under (14), the profile (b∗ , s∗ , b̃∗ , s̃∗ , p∗U )
is nontrivial. If the equilibrium is trivial, b∗ and s∗ are identically zero, so
that there is no agent for whom it is profitable to trade at price pU , and
hence for all (b, s) ∈ (0, b̄] × (0, s̄],
hS (0, s) + pU (s) − cS (s, 1) ≤ 0
and

hB (b, s) − pU (s) − cB (b, 1) ≤ 0,

where we focus on agents β = 1 = σ since they are the most likely to want
to trade. Notice that we are using here the maximum that appears in the
building block (D.11) for the specification of the seller’s payoff, and which
effectively allows the seller to sell any attribute choice s ∈ [0, s̄] at price
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pU (s), assuming in the process that he can attract at least a zero-attribute
buyer. For these two inequalities to hold, it must be that
hB (b, s) + hS (0, s) ≤ cB (b, 1) + cS (s, 1),
contradicting (14).
Full nontriviality. We now assume (15) holds. Suppose that there is
an interval of seller types [0, σ 0 ] with σ 0 > 0 who choose zero attributes. By
Lemma D.9, we then have b∗ (β) = 0 for all β ∈ [0, σ 0 ]. If neither agent of
type φ ∈ (0, β 0 ) chooses a strictly positive attribute, it must be that
hS (0, s) + pU (s) − cS (s, φ) ≤ 0
hB (b, s) − pU (s) − cB (b, φ) ≤ 0,

and

where (b, s) are a pair of attributes satisfying (15). But summing these two
inequalities yields an inequality contradicting (15).

E
E.1

Personalized Pricing
Prices

A personalized-price function is a function pP : B × S → R; where pP (b, s)
is the (possibly negative) price that seller with attribute choice s ∈ S receives when selling to a buyer with attribute choice b ∈ B. We emphasize
that a personalized-price function prices only matches between marketed
attributes.

E.2

Equilibrium

Given a feasible outcome (b, s, b̃, s̃) and a personalized price pP , the payoffs
to a buyer β who chooses b ∈ B and to a seller σ who chooses s ∈ S are
given by
ΠB (b, β) ≡ hB (b, s̃(b)) − pP (b, s̃(b)) − cB (b, β)
and

ΠS (s, σ) ≡ hS (b̃(s), s) + pP (b̃(s), s) − cS (s, σ).

The specification of equilibrium begins with appropriate modifications
of the notions of buyer and seller optimization given pU (i.e., (3) and (4)):
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Definition E.1 Given a feasible outcome (b, s, b̃, s̃), buyer β is optimizing
at b given pP if
(b(β), s̃(b(β))) ∈ arg max hB (b, s) − pP (b, s) − cB (b, β).

(E.1)

(b,s)∈B×S

Seller σ is optimizing at s given pP if
(b̃(s(σ)), s(σ)) ∈ arg max hS (b, s) + pP (b, s) − cS (s, σ).

(E.2)

(b,s)∈B×S

Since the personalized-price function pP prices only pairs of marketed
attributes, the stipulation that a seller optimize given pP says nothing about
what might happen if this seller chooses an attribute s 6∈ S. We require that
no seller can choose an attribute s 6∈ S, find a target buyer attribute b ∈ B
with whom to match, and find a way to split the resulting surplus so that
the seller and target buyer are both better off than in equilibrium:k
Definition E.2 Given (b, s, b̃, s̃, pP ), there is a profitable seller deviation
if there exists a seller σ such that either ( i) ΠS (s(σ), σ) < 0 or ( ii) there
exist an unmarketed seller attribute choice s 6∈ S, a marketed buyer attribute
b ∈ B, and a price p ∈ R such that
hB (b, s̃(b)) − pP (b, s̃(b)) < hB (b, s) − p
ΠS (s(σ), σ) < hS (b, s) + p − cS (s, σ).

and

(E.3)
(E.4)

The definition of a buyer’s profitable deviation is similar:
Definition E.3 Given (b, s, b̃, s̃, pP ), there is a profitable buyer deviation
if there exists a buyer β such that either ( i) ΠB (b(β), β) < 0 or ( ii) there
exist an unmarketed buyer attribute choice b 6∈ B, a marketed seller attribute
s ∈ S, and a price p ∈ R such that
ΠB (b(β), β) < hB (b, s) − p − cB (b, β)
and

hS (b̃(s), s) + pP (b̃(s), s) < hS (b, s) + p.

Definition E.4 A feasible outcome (b, s, b̃, s̃) and a personalized-price function pP constitute a personalized-price equilibrium if all buyers and sellers
are optimizing given pP and no buyer or seller has a profitable deviation.
k

Similar to footnote 6, Definitions E.2 and E.3 can be extended to cover deviations to
any seller attribute, as well as to prices that differ from the personalized-price function.
See Mailath, Postlewaite, and Samuelson (2010) for details.
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Remark E.1 (Premuneration Values) Since personalized prices can compensate for any alterations of the division of v(b, s), the decomposition
of the surplus v(b, s) between the buyer’s and seller’s premuneration values plays no role in the efficiency of a personalized-price equilibrium outcome. In particular, it is a straightforward calculation that if (b, s, b̃, s̃, pP )
is a personalized-price equilibrium with premuneration values hB (b, s) and
hS (b, s), then (b, s, b̃, s̃, p0P ) is a personalized-price equilibrium with premuneration values h0B (b, s) and h0S (b, s), where
p0P (b, s) = pP (b, s) + h0B (b, s) − hB (b, s) = pP (b, s) + hS (b, s) − h0S (b, s).


Remark E.2 (Ex Post Contracting Equilibrium) Cole, Mailath, and
Postlewaite (2001) study continua of buyers and sellers who first simultaneously choose attributes (as here), and then match and bargain to divide the
resulting surplus v(b, s), with the matching/bargaining stage being modeled
as a cooperative game (more specifically, an assignment game). An ex post
contracting equilibrium in Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite (2001) is a Nash
equilibrium of the noncooperative attribute-choice game, where the payoffs
from the attribute choices are determined by stable (equivalently, core) allocations in the induced assignment game.∗∗ The set of outcomes and implied
payoffs are essentially the same under the two notions (modulo some technical differences). In particular, if all buyers and sellers are optimizing in the
market given pP , then no buyer-seller pair with attributes (b, s) ∈ B × S can
block the equilibrium. Moreover, a seller σ has a profitable out-of-market
deviation if and only if there is a blocking pair consisting of that seller (with
some attribute s) and some buyer with an attribute b ∈ B. An analogous
comment applies to buyers.


E.3

Efficiency

Lemma E.1 In any personalized-price equilibrium (b, s, b̃, s̃, pP ), b̃ and s̃
are strictly increasing for strictly positive attributes.
Proof. We consider only b̃ (since s̃ is almost identical). Suppose b̃ is not
strictly increasing. Since b̃ is one-to-one on s((σ, 1]) (see Definition 1 and its
∗∗

Consequently, matching is over buyers and sellers, not attributes as here. This difference results in some technical complications.
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following comment), there exists 0 < s1 < s2 with b1 ≡ b̃(s1 ) > b̃(s2 ) ≡ b2 .
From (E.1) for the buyer choosing b1 and from (E.2) for the seller choosing
s2 , we have
hB (b1 , s1 ) − pP (b1 , s1 ) ≥ hB (b1 , s2 ) − pP (b1 , s2 )
and

hS (b2 , s2 ) + pP (b2 , s2 ) ≥ hS (b1 , s2 ) + pP (b1 , s2 ),

and so
hB (b1 , s1 ) + hS (b2 , s2 ) − pP (b1 , s1 ) + pP (b2 , s2 ) ≥ v(b1 , s2 ).
Adding this to the analogous inequality obtained from (E.1) for the buyer
choosing b2 and from (E.2) for the seller choosing s1 , we obtain
v(b1 , s1 ) + v(b2 , s2 ) ≥ v(b1 , s2 ) + v(b2 , s1 ).
But Assumption 1 requires the reverse (strict) inequality, a contradiction.

From Lemma E.1, matching in a personalized-price equilibrium is positively assortative in attributes. Since the attribute-choice functions are
strictly increasing in index when positive, we can accordingly define the ex
ante surplus for buyer and seller types β = σ = φ ∈ [0, 1] as
W (b, s, φ) ≡ hB (b, s) + hS (b, s) − cB (b, φ) − cS (s, φ)
= v(b, s) − cB (b, φ) − cS (s, φ).
An efficient choice of attributes maximizes W (b, s, φ) for (almost) all φ.
Personalized-price equilibrium outcomes are constrained efficient in the
sense that no matched pair of agents can increase its net surplus without
both agents deviating to attribute choices outside the sets of marketed attributes B and S:††
Lemma E.2 Suppose (b, s, b̃, s̃, pP ) is a personalized-price equilibrium. Then,
for all φ ∈ [0, 1], b ∈ B, s ∈ S and all b0 and s0 ,
W (b, s0 , φ) ≤ W (b(φ), s(φ), φ)
and
††

W (b0 , s, φ) ≤ W (b(φ), s(φ), φ).

This is essentially Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite (2001, Lemma 2), which describes
a constrained efficiency property of ex post contracting equilibria (see Remark E.2). The
current formulation allows a more transparent statement and proof.
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Proof. En route to a contradiction, suppose there exists φ ∈ [0, 1], b ∈ B
and s0 ∈ [0, s̄] such that W (b, s0 , φ) > W (b(φ), s(φ), φ). The other possibility
is handled analogously.
Let ε = [W (b, s0 , φ) − W (b(φ), s(φ), φ)]/3 > 0 and set p = hB (b, s0 ) −
hB (b, s̃(b)) + pP (b, s̃(b)) − ε. The seller of type σ = φ can induce a buyer
with attribute choice b to buy from him by choosing s0 and offering a price
p. Moreover, this deviation is strictly preferred by the seller φ:
hS (b, s0 ) + p − cS (s0 , φ)
= hS (b, s0 ) + hB (b, s0 ) − hB (b, s̃(b)) + pP (b, s̃(b)) − ε − cS (s0 , φ)
> ΠS (s(φ), φ) + [hB (b(φ), s(φ)) − pP (b(φ), s(φ)) − cB (b(φ), φ)]
− [hB (b, s̃(b)) − pP (b, s̃(b)) − cB (b, φ)] + ε
≥ ΠS (s(φ), φ) + ε,
where the equality uses the definition of p, the strict inequality follows from
W (b, s0 , φ) > W (b(φ), s(φ), φ) + 2ε, and the last inequality is an implication
of (E.1).
Lemma E.2 does not ensure that a personalized-price equilibrium outcome is efficient. The possibility remains that W (b, s, φ) may be maximized
by a pair of values b 6∈ B and s 6∈ S. In this sense, the inefficiency is the
result of a coordination failure. For example, for the premuneration values
hB (b, s) = θbs and hS (b, s) = (1 − θ)bs, it is an equilibrium for all agents
to choose attribute 0, giving a constrained-efficient outcome that is in fact
quite inefficient. The possible inefficiency of a uniform-price equilibrium can
be viewed as reflecting incomplete markets.
We could ensure efficiency by ensuring that a price exists for every attribute combination, whether marketed or not:
Definition E.5 The feasible outcome (b, s, b̃, s̃) and personalized price pP
is a complete personalized-price equilibrium if there is an extension of pP
to [0, b̄] × [0, s̄] (also denoted by pP ) such that for all β and all σ,
0 ≤ ΠB (b(β), β) =

sup

hB (b, s) − pP (b, s) − cB (b, β)

(b,s)∈[0,b̄]×[0,s̄]

and

0 ≤ ΠS (s(σ), σ) =

sup

hS (b, s) + pP (b, s) − cS (s, σ).

(b,s)∈[0,b̄]×[0,s̄]

Though the names suggest that every complete personalized-price equilibrium outcome is indeed a personalized-price equilibrium outcome, this is
not immediate, as we have replaced the prohibition on profitable deviations
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with the requirement that agents be optimizing given pP with respect to all
attribute choices. However, we have:
Lemma E.3
(E.3.1) Every complete personalized-price equilibrium outcome is a personalizedprice equilibrium outcome.
(E.3.2) A complete personalized-price equilibrium outcome is efficient.
Proof. Fix a complete personalized-price equilibrium (b, s, b̃, s̃, pP ). To
show that this is a personalized-price equilibrium, we must show there are
no profitable deviations. We discuss seller deviations; the buyer case is
analogous. Suppose the seller has a profitable deviation, so there exists a
type σ and an attribute choice s0 ∈
/ S, a price p ∈ R, and b0 ∈ B with
ΠS (s(σ), σ) < hS (b0 , s0 ) + p − cS (s0 , σ)

(E.5)

hB (b0 , s̃(b0 )) − pP (b0 , s̃(b0 )) < hB (b0 , s0 ) − p.

(E.6)

and
Since (b, s, b̃, s̃, pP ) is a complete personalized-price equilibrium, (E.5) implies p > pP (b0 , s0 ).
There exists some β ∈ [0, 1] for which b0 = b(β), and so subtracting
cB (b0 , β) from both sides of (E.6) and again using the assumption that
(b, s, b̃, s̃, pP ) is a complete personalized-price equilibrium gives p < pP (b0 , s0 ),
a contradiction.
Since every pair of attributes is priced, the efficiency of complete personalizedprice equilibria is a straightforward calculation.

One route to existence is to note that a personalized-price equilibrium
is essentially equivalent to Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite (2001) ex post
contracting equilibrium, and then to refer to that paper for conditions for the
existence of an ex post contracting equilibria. We take an alternative route
here, building on the relationship between personalized-price and uniformprice equilibria.
Proposition E.1 There exists an efficient personalized-price equilibrium.
Proof. Suppose first that hS (b, s) = 0 and hence hB (b, s) = v(b, s) for all
pairs (b, s). Proposition 3 ensures that there exists a complete uniform-price
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equilibrium. Since hS (b, s) = 0, this is also a complete personalized-price
equilibrium. Then, if hS (b, s) 6= 0, by setting
p0P (b, s) = pP (b, s) − hS (b, s) = pP (b, s) + hB (b, s) − v(b, s),
we again have a complete (and hence efficient) personalized-price equilibrium.

E.4

Uniform Rationing Equilibria

Lemma E.4 Any personalized-price equilibrium outcome is a uniform-rationing
equilibrium outcome.
Proof. Let (b, s, b̃, s̃) be a personalized-price equilibrium outcome and consider its associated uniform-rationing price. The conditions for the latter
to be a personalized-price equilibrium are implied by the former, with the
exception that there may now be profitable deviations by a buyer β with
attribute choice b(β) to match with a seller with s < s̃(b(β)) (and hence
b̃(s) < b(β)). But since hS (b, s) is increasing in b, the seller in question
would welcome such a match. Hence, if this match is a profitable deviation in the uniform-rationing equilibrium, it is a profitable deviation in the
personalized-price equilibrium, a contradiction.
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